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Once upon a time, there existed a clear nexus between property and privacy.
Protection of property rights was an important safeguard against intrusions of the
privacy interests of owners both by the government and by private actors. Gradually,
however, the symbiotic relationship between privacy and property has been forgotten
by scholars and policymakers and fallen into oblivion.
In this Article, we seek to restore the centrality of privacy in property law by
making two novel contributions—one descriptive and one normative. Descriptively,
we show that concerns for privacy inform, at times implicitly, many important property
doctrines. Indeed, we show that privacy provides an indispensable compass for
understanding and uniting diverse and seemingly unrelated property rules. Second, we
propose how privacy concerns can be better and more explicitly incorporated into
property law and policy. We show that attention to privacy can reinvigorate scholarly
thinking about property and lead to new solutions to longstanding problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Few doubt the centrality of property to Western civilization, but few agree
on the reason for its centrality.1
One prominent theory views property as vital for economic development.
Property law allocates exclusive rights to resources, and thereby incentivizes their
efficient management. This theory emphasizes property law’s grant of rights of
exclusion to owners.2 Another prevalent set of theories portrays property as
1 See generally Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right? 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 333-61
(1996) (outlining seven reasons why property should be considered a keystone right).
2 See id. at 358-61; see also J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 103 (1997); Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 596 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he idea of exclusion, in one form or the other, tends
to inform almost any understanding of property, whether private, public, or community”); Thomas W.
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central to personal development or moral desert. These theories focus on the
owner’s ability to exclude others from an asset, to set an agenda for it, and to
control its transfer and alienation.3 Yet another influential justification for the
centrality of property emphasizes property as the arena of accommodating both
complementary and conflicting social impulses. Theories of this kind eschew
simple characterizations of property and stress how much property doctrine
should depend on changing social needs and the particulars of the case.4
Remarkably, despite this plethora of theories justifying property, little
attention has been paid to date to the importance of property to the maintenance
of privacy. Privacy is highly valued in society and thus by the law. The Supreme
Court famously recognized a constitutional right to privacy in the landmark case
of Griswold v. Connecticut,5 and the right to privacy has continued to play an
important role in constitutional jurisprudence until today.6 Privacy concerns have
been highlighted in other areas of constitutional law, too, such as Fourth
Amendment protections against unwarranted searches and seizures.7 A cluster of
torts has also been established to develop privacy interests,8 and numerous statutes
have been enacted to protect privacy interests in many contexts.9 Particularly in
recent years, thanks to the development of improved communications technology,
issues related to privacy have come to the fore in new areas of the law, where a
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (“[T]he right to exclude others
is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”).
3 See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 298-99 (2008)
(emphasizing the importance of the owner’s ability to set an agenda for an asset); Francisco J. Morales,
Comment, The Property Matrix: An Analytical Tool to Answer the Question, “Is This Property?”, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1125, 1133 (2013); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL
L. REV. 531, 541-42 (2005) (reviewing scholarly works advocating a natural right conception of property).
See generally GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶¶ 41-70 (T.M. Knox
trans., 1967) (1821); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
4 See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 627-28
(1988). See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011).
5 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6 For a discussion of constitutional treatment of the right to privacy, see Anita L. Allen, First
Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal Social Change, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885,
885-87 (2012) (stating how the concept of privacy plays a major role in constitutional jurisprudence);
Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 10-15 (2009); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); Reva B.
Siegel, How Conflict Entrenched the Right to Privacy, 124 YALE L.J.F. 316, 316 (2015) (arguing that
Griswold helped entrench the right to privacy in constitutional jurisprudence).
7 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958). See also generally William C. Heﬀernan, Fourth
Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2001); Protecting Privacy under the
Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 313 (1981).
8 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984);
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 388-89 (1960) (dividing privacy into four distinct torts).
9 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); Children Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012); Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (2) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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heated debate exists on the appropriate relationship between privacy and property
in information.10 Yet the role of property rights in protecting privacy in the
physical world has played little role in property theory to date.
This is particularly ironic in light of the history of the development of
privacy law. It is generally acknowledged that the roots of modern
constitutional privacy law are to be found in concepts of property. Specifically,
privacy interests were originally thought to be defined by, and in service of,
property rights.11 It is only with time that privacy law separated from property
law and became a distinct legal field. Yet because privacy law has now emerged
out of property law, theories of property law no longer seem to reflect the
centrality of privacy. This development is regrettable. While there is little
doubt that the new field of privacy law protects privacy interests that are
outside the realm of property law, there is likewise little doubt that many
privacy interests that concern us still do lie within the realm of property.
Since the rise of legal realism12 and especially the work of Felix Cohen,13
academic discussions of property have largely focused on the right of property
owners to exclude others.14 Proponents of exclusion rights support their
position by reference to the values of autonomy and eﬃciency.15 Opponents
of the right to exclude, starting with the legal realists and continuing with

10 For arguments for applying property-style rights in the information space, see CARL SHAPIRO
& HAL R. VARIAN, U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION POLICY 29-31 (1997); Patricia Mell, Seeking
Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1, 26-40 (1996); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of
Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383 (1996). For arguments against applying property-style rights in the
information space, see Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1547-57 (2000); Pamela
Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1151-73 (2000); cf. Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Information, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2016) (discussing the role
of registries in the relationship between property and information access); Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs.
Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 229 (2005) (explaining the relationship between the protection of
copyright and civil liberties in cyberspace); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L.
REV. 159, 165 (2015) (discussing the development of the theory of informational privacy).
11 See generally Heﬀernan, supra note 7, at 12-15; Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century
America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, (1981).
12 See generally Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1915 (2005); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Brian
Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 50 (W. Edmundson & M. Golding eds., 2005).
13 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809 (1935).
14 E.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985); David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from Private Property:
A Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 39-40 (2000); Joseph William Singer,
No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1293 (1996).
15 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004); Radhika
Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 368 (2000) (discussing the right to
exclude based on autonomy in the context of the human body).
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progressive property scholars, buttress their position by invoking the value of
human “ﬂourishing.”16 Privacy appears to have fallen by the wayside,
receiving virtually no attention from either camp. This is not only surprising,
but also unfortunate, because privacy is paramount both to autonomy and to
human ﬂourishing and thus oﬀers a common ground or a bridge between two
of the central competing ideologies in modern property theory. More
importantly, it oﬀers a unique view of property as an institution and of its
deﬁning characteristics that has been overlooked thus far.
In this Article, we argue for giving privacy its deserved prominence among
the values protected by property law. We show that property law is in many
ways uniquely placed to protect privacy, and that privacy is rightly and
naturally protected by property law. Indeed, we show that several extant
doctrines in property law are best understood as attempts to defend
rightsholders’ privacy rights, even if current theorizing has failed to take notice.
The connection between privacy and property is evident in many existing
doctrines in property law.17 Nowhere is this effect more pronounced than in
the context of owners’ exclusion rights. As we will show, owners’ exclusion
powers are often implicitly correlated with their expectations of privacy.
Owners of commercial properties who invite the public to frequent their
establishments virtually relinquish their right to exclude. By contrast, for the
home, where owners’ privacy interests are paramount, the right to exclude is
at its strongest. The varying scope of a property owner’s right to exclude can
be best explained through a privacy prism. Compare, first, the exclusion
powers of owners of commercial properties with those of private dwellings.
Commercial properties are often governed by civil rights acts18 and the
modern version of the public accommodations doctrine.19 Together, these rules
ban owners of commercial spaces that are open to the general public, such as
hotels, shops, and restaurants, from discriminating against individual patrons
based on race, color, religion, or natural origin.20 Owners of commercial
properties to which the rules apply have no expectation of privacy. In fact, they
invite the public to visit their premises. And once they have waived their

16 See Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
743, 743 (2009) (“Values promoted by property include life and human ﬂourishing . . . .”).
17 See infra Part III.
18 Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606 (2012); Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606; see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14
Stat. 27-30 (codiﬁed as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)).
19 78 Stat. at 241.
20 See supra notes 18–19; see also, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
260-62 (1964) (holding that a motel, as a place of public accommodation, cannot exclude visitors
based on discriminatory factors such as race).
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expectation of privacy, the law abrogates their power to bar entry to individual
members of the public in an invidiously discriminatory fashion.21
Owners of private dwellings, on the other hand, can generally deny private
individuals entry to their home for any reason, including invidious discrimination.
The only limitation homeowners face here concerns their ability to engage in some
kinds of commercial acts, such as leasing their premises, or advertising services
related to the premises.22 The Fair Housing Act, for instance, mandates that ads
for the sale or lease of private spaces not express a preference based on race, color,
religion, familial status, or national origin. Yet even here, privacy concerns may
prevail and allow property rightholders a broad scope of exclusionary rights.
Consider the recent invocation of the ban on discriminatory advertising in Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com.23 There, plaintiffs claimed,
among other things, that defendants violated civil rights rules by asking users to
list gender and other preferences that would ordinarily be considered to violate
the Fair Housing Act. Rejecting the civil rights claim, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, per Judge Kozinski, cautioned that government regulation of an
individual’s ability to pick a roommate “intrudes into the home, which ‘is entitled
to special protection as the center of the private lives of our people.’”24 The Court
therefore ruled that indicating discriminatory preferences for roommates should
not be considered within the scope of the civil rights acts, and should, instead, lie
within the traditional exclusionary powers of property rightholders.25
Taking account of privacy values in property law takes on increased importance
and exigency, given contemporary debates related to new technologies. Just as the
development of commercial aviation prompted a re-examination of traditional
property doctrines such as the rules of trespass and the ad coelum doctrine,26 the
increasing use of drones, the increased exposure of household items to the
Internet, and proliferation of home-based information networks will press (and to
some degree have already pressed)27 traditional property law. Privacy concerns
must play a key role in developing the law.
See supra notes 18–19.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012) (stating that advertisements “with respect to the sale or rental of
a dwelling that indicate[] any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin” are illegal under the Act).
23 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012).
24 Id. at 1221 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
25 Id. at 1223.
26 See Chad J. Pomeroy, All Your Air Right Are Belong to Us, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
277, 287-92 (2015) (discussing the reasoning behind moving air travel outside of traditional trespass
doctrine); Note, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1582
(1961) (discussing airplane noise as a tort of trespass); see also Note, Airplane Noise, Property Rights,
and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV 1428, 1432-37 (1965) (discussing the landowner’s right to
compensatory and injunctive relief due to commercial ﬂights over their property).
27 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH.
L. REV. 385, 407 (2015) (arguing that drone operators are outside of “the aviation community’s
21
22
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In this Article, we aim to make two contributions—one descriptive and
one normative. Descriptively, our goal is to advance a privacy-centered
understanding of property. We show that notions of privacy have always been
embedded in the institution of property, even if privacy has not received the
scholarly attention it deserves. We show how privacy concerns continue to
animate several vital doctrines in extant law, even if the term privacy is
insuﬃciently highlighted. We show that, traditionally, property rules have
been pivotal to protecting privacy, and that privacy concerns have been
pivotal to developing property law.28
Normatively, we draw on our descriptive discussion to suggest how
property doctrine should be modified to offer better protection of privacy
interests. Specifically, we argue that the degree of protection offered to
property rights can be modified to reflect privacy interests. Likewise, we show
that remedies for violations of the prerogatives of property rightsholders, even
in ordinary civil property law, can and often should be scaled to the degree of
interference with the rightholder’s legitimate expectation of privacy.
One important reference for our work is contemporary jurisprudence about
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The case law has
rejected a simple approach under which any breach of traditional property rights
is considered an unreasonable search and has instead often focused on the
aggrieved’s reasonable expectations of privacy. Modern Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has thus charted an uncertain course between asset-based
conceptions of constitutional protections and those based on privacy expectations.
We illustrate the lessons that property law can learn from the successes and
failures of Fourth Amendment case law in developing a modern approach to
property-based privacy protections. A privacy-based property regime would give
extra protection to assets in which the owner has a greater privacy expectation,
such as the home, computers, and cellular devices. After illuminating how our
vision can refocus and reshape property doctrine, we explain how it fits within

culture of compliance”); Pierce Giboney, Note, Don’t Ground Me Bro!: Private Ownership of Airspace
and How it Invalidates the FAA’s Blanket Prohibition on Low Altitude Commercial Drone Operations, 67
FLA. L. REV. 2149, 2152 (2015) (discussing ownership of superadjacent airspace in the context of
drones); see also Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2211-13 (2004)
(proposing four legal approaches to protecting information networks); Pomeroy, supra note 26, at
292 (arguing that drones do not typically fall into the exception to trespass that was designed for
aircraft). See generally Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 23-43 (2007)
(discussing the creation and expansion of the cyberproperty legal theory).
28 Notably, we do not intend to venture into the debate about the need to recognize rights to
personal information as “property.” This debate lies outside the ken of our article, and we do not
wish to contribute to the vast literature it has spawned. See e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael
L. Katz, Privacy, Property Rights and Eﬃciency: The Economics of Privacy as Secrecy, 4 QUANTITATIVE
MARKETING & ECON. 209, 210 (2006); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information:
An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383-84 (1996).

876

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 869

the broader framework of property theory by juxtaposing it with leading property
theories that predominate the scholarly discourse.
Before we proceed, several clarifications are in order. We do not argue that
protection of privacy is the sole justification for the institution of property. We
readily acknowledge that property law serves other purposes. Private property
rights are important to induce optimal investment in and management of
assets, as several prominent theories have argued.29 We are also mindful of the
work of other influential scholars who have advanced broad and multifaceted
theories of property; we have no argument with them either. We acknowledge
too that the totality of extant privacy law cannot be incorporated en masse into
property law. Our aim in this Article is not to discredit extant theories of
property, nor is it to elevate privacy above all other interests advanced by
property, nor to subordinate privacy law to property law. Our project is much
more modest: we wish to reinstate privacy’s pride of place in the law of property
and restore property law’s sensitivity to privacy interests both when it defines
the scope of property rights and when it seeks to defend them.
Likewise, our account should not be read to negate property protection to
possessions without a heightened privacy interest. No such negative inference
should be made. An article of clothing on public display or an unfenced front
lawn are still private property, even if the owner has no expectation of privacy.
In our approach to property law, those assets would, of course, still be considered
property and still be entitled to protection by law. But the protection granted to
them would be narrower in scope and weaker in magnitude than that granted to
assets that owners associate with their privacy interest.
With these caveats in mind, we present our argument as follows. In Part
I, we review the historical roots of the right to privacy. We show that the roots
of the right to privacy can be traced back to the domain of private law, and
that it was derived from, among other things, property doctrines. In Part II,
we turn our attention to the Fourth Amendment to gain a better
understanding of the relationship between property and privacy. In Part III,
we discuss extant property doctrines that embody and protect privacy
expectations, with a focus on highlighting how privacy concerns already play
a role in the law. In Part IV, we develop a normative account of property law
that is centered around protection of privacy and explore its implications for
property policy and scholarship alike. In Part V, we explore the interface
between the privacy-based conception of property and other inﬂuential
property theories. A short conclusion ensues.

29 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 355-59
(1967). See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004).
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I. PROPERTY THEORIES AND PRIVACY
In this Part, we lay the theoretical groundwork for our analysis by looking
at the development of privacy law, both within and without the law of
property. We begin with a preliminary matter, by looking more broadly at the
world of property theory.
A. Extant Property Theories
The institution of private property has preoccupied philosophers, legal
thinkers, and economists since antiquity. Unsurprisingly, multiple theories
have been advanced to justify its existence. Existing justiﬁcations of the
institution of property can be divided into two broad categories:
nonutilitarian and utilitarian. As we will show, while the world of property
theory is rich and fascinating, none of the major theories of property are
centered, or even related, to the notion of privacy.
We begin our exegesis of the world of property theories with Aristotle.
Aristotle justified the notion of private property, and in particular, the right
to exclude, by reference to individual virtue. He explained that individual
owners can only signal their virtue by waiving their right to exclude and
allowing others to come on their property if the law provides the backdrop of
a general norm of exclusion.30 For him, private property served an important
general condition that helped separate virtuous owners from nonvirtuous ones.
Another philosophical investigation aimed at justifying the existence of
private property is found in the work of John Locke. Locke’s theory, which
remains immensely influential to this day, relied on desert, or more specifically
labor, as the key principle that supports recognition of private property rights
in objects. In his theory, the laborer earns a superior entitlement to unowned
external resources when the laborer mixes effort with those resources by dint
of the labor investment the laborer has made.31 Importantly, John Locke
appeared to adopt two different senses of property in his writings—a narrow
one that corresponded closely with traditional understandings of the term, and

30 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS ¶ 5, at 25-29 (Stephen Everson ed., 1988).
31 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ¶ 27, at 17 (Thomas P. Peardon

ed., 1952) (1690). As Locke famously wrote,
[E]very man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself.
The labor of his body and the work of his hands . . . are properly his. Whatsoever then
he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed his
labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.
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a broader one, in which Locke included such abstractions as liberty.32 This
broader conception, however, is generally not used by modern theorists.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,33 and contemporary theorists such as
Margaret Radin,34 connected private property rights to human personhood,
suggesting that humans need material assets through which to reflect their
personalities and to achieve self-actualization. Hegel’s work highlighted the link
between property and the self. To Hegel, property constituted the mechanism
by which humans achieve self-actualization. He believed that the human will
requires material objects to manifest itself and that without them individual
freedom could not exist.35 Property, Hegel wrote, “is the means by which I give
my will an embodiment.”36 More generally, he believed that one “has as his
substantive end the right of putting his will into any and every thing and thereby
making it his, because it has no such end in itself and derives its destiny and soul
from his will. This is the absolute right of appropriation . . . over all ‘things.’”37
Yet neither Hegel nor the scholars that have followed in his footsteps placed any
emphasis on the importance of privacy.
Moving to the utilitarian side of the ledger, the English legal philosopher
Jeremy Bentham argued that private property is a necessary condition for
maximizing human happiness.38 Bentham’s account of property was primarily,
albeit not exclusively, positive. He rejected the notion that the right to property
was a natural right. Still, he has claimed that, as a general matter, the law ought
to protect individual expectations.39 Thus, he resisted the idea of property
redistribution as it upset the ability of owners to come up with “a general plan
of conduct.”40 Bentham’s theory neglected the expectation of nonowners. Nor
did he make a real attempt to inquire how individual expectations are shaped.
Contemporary utilitarian theorists have developed a more complete
account of the relationship between private property and social welfare by
32 Id. ¶ 6 at 5-6; see also Henry Moulds, Private Property in John Locke’s State of Nature, 23 AM. J. ECON.
& SOC. 179, 188 (1964) (describing Locke’s theory “that property, broadly conceived, is anything that is one’s
own—life and liberty as well as the tangibles that too often engross the attention of modern man”).
33 See HEGEL, supra note 3.
34 Radin, supra note 3, at 957 (laying out a personhood theory of property which requires
control over resources in a person’s environment in order for self-development to occur).
35 HEGEL, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 39-45.
36 Id. ¶ 46(a).
37 Id. ¶ 44.
38 See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE (1830). Bentham also
analyzed property rights in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 41-59 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., 1978). The best edition is that contained in JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF
LEGISLATION (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931).
39 NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 53
(Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987) (“Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights,
rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.”).
40 BENTHAM, supra note 38, at 111.
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tying the concept of private property to efficient use and management of
resources. Harold Demsetz, in a pathbreaking article, powerfully argued that
private property rights lead to efficient use of resources by internalizing all
marginal costs and benefits in the hands of a single owner.41 Comparing an
open-access regime to one of private property rights with a single owner,
Demsetz showed that the former reduces the value of resources by
encouraging their overuse and depletion, while the latter induces optimal
utilization.42 Open-access regimes enable users to enjoy the full benefit they
can derive from a resource—be it a forest, a park, an ocean fishery, or a city
street—without taking full account of the cost created by their depletion of
the asset. Realizing this potential, users will exploit assets to their full ability,
even if this means that the resource will ultimately be ruined. This dynamic
results in what Garret Hardin famously described as “the tragedy of the
commons.”43 Formalizing private property rights in a resource in the hands of
a single owner avoids this gloomy outcome. When all rights to a resource are
held by a single individual, that individual not only enjoys the full value that
can be derived from a resource, but also bears the full cost that her decisions
impose on the resource. Overexploitation or mismanagement reduce the value
of the resource to its owner and thus the owner will try to avoid them.
Reﬁning the Demsetzian insight, Steven Shavell proposed that private
property rights lead to eﬃcient investment of labor in resources.44 While
Demsetz emphasized the value of resources, Shavell focused on the
investment decisions of asset owners. Ultimately, however, both accounts
focus on value maximization and the eﬃciency created by concentrating
ownership of an asset in the hands of a single owner.
A radically diﬀerent vision of property can be found in the work of the
group of scholars, who view themselves as advancing a vision of “progressive
property.” The progressive property scholars, who include Greg Alexander,
Joseph Singer, Eduardo Penalver, Laura Underkuﬄer,45 Hanoch Dagan,46 and
Jedidiah Purdy,47 suggest that property, like all other legal institutions, should
See generally Demsetz, supra note 29.
Id. at 356.
Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 20-21 (2004).
Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743
(2009). For criticism, see Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive
Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 108, 145 (2013).
46 See generally HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 164-65 (2013); DAGAN, supra note 4.
47 JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE
LEGAL IMAGINATION (2010); Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the
Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047 (2007). Purdy does not see himself as a
member of the “progressive property” movement despite his critique of exclusion essentialism. See
41
42
43
44
45

880

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 869

be designed to promote human ﬂourishing, which they view as a broader
concept than “utility” as the expression is used by utilitarians and economists.
The progressive property scholars argue that property protection should be
focused not solely on the interests or personality of owners, but rather on
broad societal goals including those of nonowners that are sometimes at odds
with the interests of the owners. So there can be no single sacrosanct principle
or guideline that can guide policymakers.48
To be sure, scholars occasionally recognize the importance of property rights
to protecting privacy. Perhaps the most outstanding example of that recognition
is from Jeremy Waldron. Waldron notes that property can serve many purposes,
including “privacy and free trade,”49 and he observed that the right to exclude, in
particular, helps create a “realm of private freedom . . . where [one] can make
decisions about what to do and how to do it, justifying these decisions if at all
only to [one]self.”50 Waldron added that individuals “need a refuge from the
general society of mankind[,] . . . a place where they can be assured of being
alone . . . or assured of the conditions of intimacy with others . . . .”51
Astoundingly, Waldron’s observation on privacy has not seemed to have
struck deep roots in the theoretic property literature. Despite the linguistic
family resemblance between “private property” and “privacy,” a privacy-based
justiﬁcation of private property is nearly absent from the modern literature
and scholarly debates. It was not always like this. As we will show, historically,
the right to privacy was intricately related to the concept of property. In fact,
originally, privacy rights were seen as derivative of private law.52 In recent
years, however, the right to exclude has become the focal point of scholarly
debates, and the right to privacy has fallen to the wayside. One can argue of
course that the right to privacy is subsumed in the right to exclude. Strong
protection of the owner’s right to exclude invariably protects her privacy
interests.53 But this argument misses the point. The right to exclude is
generally couched and defended in utilitarian terms.54 Detractors of the right
Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1030-32 (2011)
(understanding Purdy’s views within the context of pluralistic values in property law).
48 Alexander, supra note 47.
49 JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 412 (1988).
50 Id. at 295.
51 Id. at 296.
52 Alexander, supra note 47.
53 See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2012) (“The Court has
recognized Fourth Amendment privacy interests that are best described as arising from the rights
of individuals to exclude others . . . .”).
54 As Demsetz states, “The resulting private ownership of land will internalize many of the external
costs associated with communal ownership, for now an owner, by virtue of his power to exclude others, can
generally count on realizing the rewards associated with husbanding the game and increasing the fertility
of his land.” Supra note 29, at 356. Demsetz concluded that “[t]his concentration of benefits and costs on
owners creates incentives to utilize resources more efficiently.” Id. But see ARISTOTLE, supra note 30, at
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to exclude rest their case on distributive-justice and social-justice theories.55
Privacy considerations are entirely missing from the exchange. This is truly
unfortunate. As the debate currently stands, no common ground exists
between the two main camps of the debate. Each side rests its case on
diﬀerent and largely incommensurate philosophies. Introducing privacy into
the discussion has the potential to bridge the competing views of property.
B. The Emergence of Privacy Law from Property
Privacy law was unknown until the nineteenth century. This is not to say
that privacy was not protected by law. The law protected many privacy
interests, but the main bulwark for privacy protection was found in legal
protection of property rights. As far back as 1499 or 1506,56 one can find legal
expression of the English maxim that “a man’s house . . . [is] his castle.”57 Even
as the law provided for a handful of other legal tools for protecting privacy
interests—such as a tort against “eavesdropping”58—the primary means for
protecting privacy interests remained the protection of private property
against intrusion, with force if necessary.59 Blackstone wrote that the law has
“so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house that it
stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity.”60
Several developments, from the growth of government records and the
invention of the telegraph to the development of the modern newspaper led
to increasing legal attention to privacy interests.61 Yet the strands only
coalesced into a new law of privacy with the appearance of Louis Warren’s and
Samuel Brandeis’s famous 1890 article arguing that the common law protects
a right to privacy.62 Even though Warren and Brandeis cast their argument in
descriptive terms, Roscoe Pound described the article as revolutionary.63

26-27 (justifying the right to exclude by reference to virtue); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY 295 (1988) (justifying the right to exclude on the basis of both liberty and privacy);
Balganesh, supra note 2, at 620 (justifying the right to exclude on the principle of inviolability).
55 See Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 1023-24.
56 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 316 (J.H. Baker ed., 1978); see also The Right to
Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 11, at 1894 n.18 (1981); Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History
of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY §§ 1–2 (Kristen J. Mathews ed., 2016).
57 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223.
58 See id. at *168-69 (defining the offense as “listen[ing] under walls or windows, or the eaves of
a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales . . . .”);
The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 11, at 1896 & n. 32.
59 The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 11, at 1898.
60 BLACKSTONE, supra note 57, at *223; see also Solove, supra note 56, at 1-4.
61 Id.
62 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
63 Letter from Roscoe Pound to William Chilton (1916), in A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A
MAN’S LIFE 70 (1956).
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Warren and Brandeis advanced a conceptualization of privacy that has
since then widely become known as “the right to be let alone.”64 Warren and
Brandeis suggested that the right to privacy protected a person’s choice to
reveal or refuse to reveal information about one’s “private life, habits, acts, and
relations” to others.65 Protection of that information, according to Warren and
Brandeis, was essential to upholding individual self-esteem.66 Constructing
their case along the private–public divide that was extremely influential then,
Warren and Brandeis contended that legal recognition of the right to privacy
confers upon individuals the “power to fix the limits of the publicity which
shall be given them.”67 To Warren and Brandeis, the right to privacy was
“essential to that aspect of individualism which involved the individual’s
affirmative capacity for self-determination, autonomy, and human dignity.”68
Warren and Brandeis argued that a person’s self-esteem is affected when
information about that person is shared with others nonconsensually.
The core project of Warren and Brandeis was to identify doctrines from
various legal domains that eﬀectively protect privacy interests, and,
moreover, that formal legal recognition of the right to privacy as a protected
interest is a natural next step. Importantly, Warren and Brandeis did not seek
to conjure up the right to privacy out of thin air. Rather, they contended that
the common law encompasses a right to privacy and scoured its diﬀerent
domains to substantiate their claim.
In addition to establishing a case for granting protection to privacy, they
attempted to place the right to privacy in a broader jurisprudential vision.
Thus, “[t]hey placed the right to privacy within the more general category of
the individual’s right to be let alone. The right to be let alone,” Dorothy Glancy
explains, “was itself part of an even more general right, the right to enjoy life,
which was in turn part of the individual’s fundamental right to life itself.”69
“The right to life,” Glancy continued, “was part of the familiar triad of
fundamental, inherent, individual rights reflected in the [F]ifth [A]mendment
to the United States Constitution: ‘No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .’”70

64 Dorothy Glancy suggested that the term owes its origin to Thomas Cooley who used it in
his TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1st ed. 1879). See Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of
the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3 n.13 (1979).
65 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 216.
66 Id. at 197.
67 Id. at 198.
68 Glancy, supra note 64, at 24.
69 Id. at 3.
70 Id.
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Importantly, for our purposes, Warren and Brandeis were careful to
distinguish between privacy and property.71 To them, property centered on
“every form of possession—intangible as well as tangible,” and was therefore
concerned with material well-being.72 Privacy, by contrast, focused on a person’s
inner self and her psychological well-being. The conception of privacy that
emerges from Warren’s and Brandeis’s article is deeply rooted in the concept of
individualism. Privacy, to them, was an important attribute of individualism and
a necessary legal construction for the protection of it.73 As commentators have
pointed out, the conception espoused by Warren and Brandeis was heavily
influenced by the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, who used the centrality of
solitude for cultivating individualism.74 Emerson, however, did not focus his
attention on privacy. Warren and Brandeis believed that although solitude was
an important aspect of privacy, it did not exhaust all human conditions covered
by the term. Privacy also covered voluntary social interactions with others.
Solitude and privacy overlapped only if an individual chose to be alone.
Warren and Brandeis sought to add a practical dimension to the discussion
of privacy by emphasizing the importance of legal protection. They maintained
that privacy should receive legal protection against the government and private
parties alike. This was a key innovation of their famous article; until then, the
predominant view among scholars was that privacy protection avails only against
the government.75 Warren and Brandeis rejected this view, contending that the
distinction between governmental and nongovernmental bodies should be
abandoned: “The common law has always recognized a man’s house as his castle,
impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its
commands. Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to constituted
authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity?”76
As important, in keeping with their ambition to establish legal protection
for a right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis also discussed the remedial aspects
entailed by their quest. They argued that violations of the right to privacy
should be penalized by a wide range of remedies, from monetary damages,
through injunctions, to criminal sanctions.77
While Warren’s and Brandeis’s article has been extremely inﬂuential, it
has had two side eﬀects that are signiﬁcant to property law. First, Warren and
71 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 213 (“[T]he principle which has been applied to protect
these rights is in reality not the principle of private property. . . . The principle which protects personal
writings and any other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy . . . .”).
72 Id. at 193, 197.
73 Id. at 196 (“[S]olitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual . . . .”).
74 Glancy, supra note 64, at 26.
75 Id. at 29.
76 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 220.
77 Id. at 219.
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Brandeis severed the tie between property and privacy. They advanced a
conception of privacy that is independent of traditional understandings of
property. By unmooring privacy from property, they made a case for privacy
protections in areas devoid of property interests. This, in turn, expanded the
reach of privacy protection, but left it unmoored—vague and ambiguous in
its ultimate scope and ambitions.
Second, and relatedly, privacy law following Warren and Brandeis has
become very broad and muddled. Privacy interests are protected today in
several constitutional doctrines, in several torts, and in dozens of statutes
protecting speciﬁc privacy interests and types of information. The privacy
interest is invoked in reference to such disparate topics as criminal procedure,
contraception and medical-information technology, with no perceived need
for a unitary theory of privacy, the nature of people’s interest in privacy or a
particular body of law with which to protect privacy.
II. PRIVACY IN CONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
In the century since Warren and Brandeis wrote for recognizing a right to
privacy, privacy rights have appeared in many areas of the law. Indeed, the
mushrooming of privacy rights has led some scholars to throw up their hands,
labeling the right of privacy “chameleon-like,” “vague and evanescent,” “protean,”
and ultimately “about everything, and therefore . . . nothing.”78 Several torts have
been identified as sounding in privacy,79 and dozens of statutes protect privacy
interests through regulatory schemes and private rights of action.80 The statutes
cover such varied topics as medical information,81 consumer information,82
government surveillance,83 bank records,84 and searches of students at school.85
Very few of the new privacy rights resemble property rights. Privacy rights
in information, for instance, are not constructed like intellectual property rights,
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479-80 (2006).
See Prosser, supra note 8, at 388-89 (identifying the privacy-related torts of appropriation,
unreasonable intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and false light in the public eye).
80 See generally Solove, supra note 56.
81 See Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264,
110 Stat. 1936, 2033-34 (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.) (creating data-security
standards to safeguard medical information).
82 See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (regulating the collection of
consumer credit information).
83 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline
Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 50
U.S.C.) (reauthorizing and reforming government surveillance programs); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012) (regulating the collection of foreign intelligence).
84 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012).
85 Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012) (also known as
the “Buckley Amendment”).
78
79
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nor like traditional property rights. Still, some areas of privacy law have
developed near property law. In this Part, we look at one particular area of
privacy law—that developed in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence about the
constitutionality of searches and seizures. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
particularly important for us because it was traditionally oriented around
property, and it has struggled for decades to develop a stable model for
incorporating privacy concerns. The lessons of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence are thus vital for crafting a privacy-oriented view of property law.
A. Privacy, Property, and the Fourth Amendment
While privacy-oriented interpretations of property law are the exception
rather than the rule these days, in at least one area of the law—the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches—privacy has become a
dominant ingredient in judicial interpretations of the scope of legal protections.
The relevant part of the Fourth Amendment for our discussion is its
guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by state actors.
On its face, the protection of the Fourth Amendment appears to be limited to
certain kinds of physical objects. The relevant part of the constitutional text states
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”86 One
might read this as stating that a search can only be unreasonable if it interferes
with the possession of houses, papers, and effects, or if it is conducted on the
body of a person. And, indeed, until fifty years ago, the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures was held to set out a rule
protecting “constitutionally protected” areas or objects against certain kinds of
physical invasions or interferences.87 The Fourth Amendment, in other words,
was thought to protect possession of the material and the tangible.
Take the 1928 Supreme Court decision Olmstead v. United States.88 There,
the Court had to consider whether Ralph Olmstead’s constitutional rights had
been violated when his home had been electronically wiretapped.89 Olmstead
had been accused of engaging in commerce of alcoholic beverages in violation
of the Volstead Act; Olmstead’s defense was that the damning evidence had
been collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (“[T]he correct solution of Fourth
Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally
protected area.’”); see also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (stating that while the
home is a protected space, it loses this status when converted into a commercial area).
88 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
89 Id.
86
87
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unreasonable searches and seizures.90 Anticipating the Court’s later
endorsement of the Exclusionary Rule, Olmstead argued that using this
evidence against him was unconstitutional.91 The Court avoided the questions
about excluding evidence by ruling that the search had comported with the
Fourth Amendment. “The Amendment itself,” the Court said,
shows that the search is to be of material things—the person, the house, his
papers, or his eﬀects. The description of the warrant necessary to make the
proceeding lawful is that it must specify the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized.92

Contrasting wiretapping with forbidden seizure of sealed letters in the
mail, the Court emphasized the importance of focusing on things.
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the
use of the sense of hearing, and that only. There was no entry of the houses or
offices of the defendants. By the invention of the telephone 50 years ago, and its
application for the purpose of extending communications, one can talk with
another at a far distant place. The language of the amendment cannot be
extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world
from the defendant’s house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his
house or office, any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.93

It was not until the landmark 1967 decision of Katz v. United States94 that
the Supreme Court changed the emphasis of constitutional search and seizure
law from the physical invasion of spaces or seizure of things to interferences
with individual expectations of privacy. In Katz, the Court had to determine
whether eavesdropping on conversations taking place in a public telephone
booth constituted an unreasonable “seizure.”95 Under the rule of Olmstead, the
case would be easily resolved for the prosecution, because the public telephone
booth was a public place, and no things had been taken. But the Court chose a
different approach. Rejecting the theory that the case turned on an analysis of
the amount of constitutional protection extended to the physical space within
telephone booths, the Court stated that the real issue was the suspect’s aim of
protecting his privacy in the booth. Ruling that the suspect sought to exclude
the “uninvited ear” when he occupied the telephone booth, closed the door, and
inserted his coin to pay for the telephone call, the Court determined that one
Id. at 455-57.
Olmstead claimed that using the evidence would violate his Fifth Amendment rights against
self-incrimination. Id. at 455.
92 Id. at 464 (emphasis in original).
93 Id. at 464-65.
94 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
95 Id. at 353-54.
90
91
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“who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world” even if the booth
itself is a public place.96 Explicitly rejecting both Olmstead and what it called
the “narrow view” that Fourth Amendment protections focus on “tangible
items,”97 the Court stated that it should be clear that “the Fourth Amendment
protects people—and not simply ‘areas’ [or things]—against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . . Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that
he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”98
Today, it is well established that “[a] ‘search’ [for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment] occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to consider reasonable is infringed.”99 The focus of the law of unreasonable
searches has thus moved from a focus on the nature of the object to the nature
of the possessor’s expectation of privacy.
Recent cases illustrate the importance of this change. Consider the
Supreme Court’s approach to aerial surveillance in California v. Ciraolo.100
Police had rented a private airplane and, without ﬁrst obtaining a search
warrant, ﬂew over the defendant’s land to determine whether he was growing
marijuana on the premises.101 Having seen and photographed marijuana
plants from the air, the police then sought and obtained a search warrant, and
raided the grounds, seizing seventy-three marijuana plants.102 The defendant
argued that the overﬂight was an unreasonable “search.”103
Had the Court focused on physical spaces or tangible objects, it would
have had to determine whether the air space above private land was within
the scope of the property interest in the land, and therefore protected from
unreasonable searches just like the land. But in the post-Katz world, the scope
of the property right in land was irrelevant. The true question for the Court
was whether the defendant had an expectation of privacy for the particular
kind of observation by which the search was conducted. Thus, the Court
analyzed not whether the defendant viewed the garden as a private space—in
light of the ten-foot walls surrounding the area, it was clear that the defendant
viewed the area as private104—but, rather, whether the defendant had
96 Id. at 352.
97 Id. at 353.
98 Id. at 353, 359.
99 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
100 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
101 Id. at 209.
102 Id. at 209-10.
103 Id. at 212.
104 See id. at 211 (“Clearly . . . respondent has met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent

and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits . . . . It can reasonably be assumed
that the 10-foot fence was placed to conceal the marijuana crop from at least street-level views.”).
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manifested an intent to shield the plants from aerial observation.105 The
Court determined that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy and the search was thus reasonable.106 According to the Court, “[t]he
observations by Oﬃcers Shutz and Rodriguez in this case took place within
public navigable airspace . . . . Any member of the public ﬂying in this
airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these oﬃcers
observed.”107 “On this record,” the Court continued, “we readily conclude that
respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected from such observation
is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor.”108
Another interesting example is the Court’s decision in Riley v. California.109
Riley had been stopped by a police officer for driving with expired registration
tags and was discovered to have a suspended driver’s license.110 In a search of
the vehicle incidental to the traffic stop, the officer found two guns concealed
under the car’s hood, leading to Riley’s arrest.111 The arrest, in turn, led the
police to search Riley’s pockets, where an officer found a smart phone.112 The
smart phone contained evidence that Riley was a member of the Bloods street
gang.113 Riley sought to exclude the evidence from the phone.114 While
acknowledging the officer’s right to search Riley’s pockets incidental to the
arrest, and therefore to seize objects in his pockets including the phone, Riley
argued that the data in the phone was protected against a warrantless search.115
The Court agreed. Noting that “[c]ell phones . . . place vast quantities of
personal information literally in the hands of individuals,” the Court held that
the digital content on cell phones was protected from warrantless search, even
when the physical phone itself could be taken without a warrant.116
Yet even as the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment has shifted its focus
from tangible things to abstract expectations of privacy, it has ultimately
remained bound to the physical. In several cases, the Supreme Court has
Id. at 213.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 213-14.
Id. at 214.
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
Id. at 2480.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2481.
Id. A companion case addressed by the same opinion, United States v. Wurie, involved the
data on Brima Wurie’s phones; Wurie had been arrested for a drug sale, and oﬃcers seized two cell
phones from him when his arrest was processed at the police station. Id. at 2481. The police used
information from the cell phones to get a search warrant for Wurie’s home, where they found 215
grams of crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a ﬁrearm and ammunition, and cash. Id. Like
Riley, Wurie claimed protection for the data in the phone. Id. at 2482.
116 Id. at 2485.
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
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rejected the idea that expectations of privacy relate purely to information,
without connection to the physical location where the information is produced.
Consider Kyllo v. United States,117 where the Court had to determine
“whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a
public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”118 Danny Kyllo had
grown marijuana illegally in his home, using high-intensity lamps in place of
sunlight.119 The thermal-imaging devices detected the high amount of heat
produced in the home by the lamps, and police used the results of the scans to
get a search warrant, enter the home, and seize over one hundred plants.120
The scanning itself, however, had been conducted without a search warrant,
and Kyllo claimed that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights.121 The lower
courts denied Kyllo’s claim, holding that Kyllo had not tried to conceal the
heat escaping from the home, showing that he did not expect that the
information would be secret, and, in any event, “there was no objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy because the [scanner] ‘did not expose any
intimate details of Kyllo’s life,’ only ‘amorphous “hot spots” on the roof and
exterior wall.’”122 The Supreme Court, however, held for Kyllo. The Court
recalled that “well into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass” and stated that even though
Fourth Amendment rights had been “decoupled . . . from trespassory
violation of . . . property,”123 many basic property-related conceptions
remained within the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For instance, while
the Fourth Amendment gave no protection to items within the home that were
in “plain view” of the public streets, constitutional protection was still
heightened for the “area immediately adjacent to a private home” and for areas
within the home that are “covered.”124 On that basis, the Court ruled that even
though the thermal information could be obtained without physically entering
the home, it was constitutionally protected, as it emanated from the covered
areas of the home. In some cases, the area creates the expectation of privacy;
the Court noted, “[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”125

117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31 (quoting United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 37.
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The 2012 case of United States v. Jones126 has thrown into stark relief the
tension between the Court’s property- and privacy-oriented jurisprudence.
Jones involved the use of the data of a GPS device in a car. Police investigators
received a warrant to attach a GPS tracking device to the underside of the
defendant’s car in Washington, D.C. within ten days, but they attached the
device on the eleventh day, in Maryland.127 The defendant sought to exclude
information obtained by the device because GPS data was the product of a
constitutional “search” and that failing to comply with the terms of the
warrant rendered the search illegal.128 The government contended that the
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the location of his
vehicle, and that, consequently, there was no constitutional “search.”129 The
district court accepted the government’s contention in part, holding that
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy while the defendant drove on
the public streets; the ruling yielded suﬃcient evidence to convict the
defendant of drug traﬃcking.130 A reversal by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals led the Supreme Court to re-evaluate the scope of the Katz ruling.
In Jones, the Supreme Court not only ruled for the defendant; it reasserted
the importance of the asset-based approach to the Fourth Amendment. Noting
that the government “physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information,”131 the Court ruled that the government necessarily
conducted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because
it intruded upon defendant’s property in a manner that would be considered
trespass.132 Rejecting the argument that the Fourth Amendment protects
“people not places,” the Court stated that defendant’s “Fourth Amendment
rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”133 Painfully distinguishing
a plethora of cases that seemed to indicate otherwise, the Court insisted that
a trespassory search is always a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and Katz should not be read to “repudiate that understanding.”134
Rather, the Court ruled that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
has been added to, not substituted for, the common law trespassory test.”135
After Jones, Fourth Amendment law remains in ﬂux. Katz and its progeny
have brought into the constitutional law of search and seizure a concern with
privacy expectations completely detached from the traditional thing-oriented
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

565 U.S. 400 (2012).
Id. at 402-03.
Id.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 404-05.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 406-07.
Id. at 409.
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understanding of the law. At the same time, Jones aﬃrmed the vitality of the
traditional thing-centered rules of constitutional search and seizure law. The
Supreme Court’s most recent foray into search and seizure law, Carpenter v.
United States, failed to dispel the confusion.136 Holding that a valid warrant
was necessary to collect cell-site location information stored on cell phones
of robbery suspects, the Court purported to be following Jones, even as its
reasoning was far closer to the Katz line of cases. The balance between the
competing approaches is yet to be decided.
B. Criticisms of Current Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The privacy-based jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment has been
strongly criticized. The harshest critics argue that the “reasonable expectations of
privacy” test does not and cannot dictate results, and it is logically incoherent. As
Matthew Kugler and Lior Strahilevitz recently wrote, naming four Supreme
Court justices, three other judges, and nine legal academics, there is widespread
agreement that “there is a degree of circularity in the Katz ‘reasonable
expectations of privacy’ test.”137 According to critics, the Court’s post-Katz Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence requires courts to extend the Fourth Amendment’s
protection to any objects within the scope of the public’s reasonable expectation
of privacy for the object, but the public’s reasonable expectation of privacy for
the object is largely determined by the court’s decisions about whether legal
protection extends to the object. As Judge Posner wrote, “it is circular to say that
there is no invasion of privacy unless the individual whose privacy is invaded had
a reasonable expectation of privacy; whether he will or will not have such an
expectation will depend on what the legal rule is.”138 The result is an inquiry in
which the premise depends on the outcome.
A softer version of this criticism views the reasonable expectation of
privacy test as excessively malleable. Many have criticized current doctrine as
insuﬃciently protective of suspects’ rights,139 and argued that the fault lies in
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84
U. CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1748 (2017) (citations omitted).
138 Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT.
REV. 173, 188 (1979).
139 See AMITAI ETZIONI, PRIVACY IN A CYBER AGE: POLICY AND PRACTICE 51 (2015) (“The
reasonable expectation of privacy standard is not only highly malleable by the courts but also subject
to inﬂuence by various institutions.”); William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of
the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1870 (2016) (“But the twists involved render the
privacy test very malleable and suggest that something else is going on.”); Scott E. Sundby,
“Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1753 (1994) (“[M]ost arguments have coalesced along the lines that the Court
has not properly measured the individual’s expectations of privacy . . . .”); see also Ricardo J. Bascuas,
The Fourth Amendment in the Information Age, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 481, 490 (2013) (comparing the
136
137
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a test capable of “taking on many alternative meanings” and therefore “open
to ready manipulation.”140
The mildest version of the criticism simply sees the test as “unstable.”141
As Daniel Solove wrote,
Few commentators are particularly fond of Fourth Amendment law. U.S. Supreme
Court decisions applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test have been
attacked as “unstable” and “illogical,” and even as engendering “pandemonium.”
As one commentator has aptly observed, “[M]ost commentators have recognized
that regardless of the political palatability of recent decisions, [F]ourth
[A]mendment doctrine is in a state of theoretical chaos . . . .”142

To be sure, the Court’s jurisprudence has its defenders. Several scholars
praise the decision in Katz, even while opposing other aspects of the Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.143 And while criticism of the alleged
circularity of the “reasonable expectations of privacy” test is widely shared,
there are grounds for defending the court against the charge. In a recent work,
Matthew Kugler and Lior Strahilevitz examined how much the Court’s
privacy-expectations test is circular by surveying the public for its expectations
of privacy in cell-phone data both before and after the Supreme Court ruling
in Riley v. California.144 Recall that Riley involved the seizure of a telephone
incidental to an arrest. The question raised by the case was whether the police,
who lawfully seized the phone itself, had the right to extract the data from the
phone by operating it. The Court ultimately decided that the data was
protected and could not be taken without a warrant.145 As Kugler and
Strahilevitz noted, the outcome of Riley was not predicted, and it represented
“an unambiguous change in law.”146 This meant that if the public’s expectations
of privacy were developed based on Supreme Court rulings, the ruling in Riley
should have caused a measurable change in public opinion: the decision should
have resulted in an increased expectation of privacy in cell phone data. But the
trespass test from Jones with the Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test and noting that,
“[d]espite its pretentions, Jones does not redress Katz’s ﬂaws so much as mimic them[;] Jones creates
a new trespass test, just as malleable as Katz’s expectations-of-privacy approach”).
140 John B. Mitchell, What Went Wrong with the Warren Court’s Conception of the Fourth
Amendment?, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 35, 40 (1992).
141 Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and
Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002).
142 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (2010) (citations omitted).
143 See generally Daniel T. Pesciotta, Note, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment
in the 21st Century, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 190 (“Despite heavy academic criticism of the
reasonable expectation of privacy test, both Supreme Court and lower federal court cases provide little
reason to worry that the test is ill suited for protecting citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.”).
144 See generally Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 137.
145 See supra notes 109–116 and accompanying text.
146 See Kugler & Strahlievetiz, supra note 137, at 1774 (citation omitted).
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Kugler–Strahilevitz study showed that the public expectations were not
greatly altered by the Court’s decision.147 In the immediate aftermath of the
decision, there was an immediate spike in the percentage of the population
that believed that a warrant is necessary to access cell phone data. Yet the
public quickly returned to its previous beliefs; any effect the decision may have
had dissipated within weeks and months, and by the time two years had
elapsed from the decisions, no change in public attitudes was discernable.
Our aim in this Article is not to resolve the problems of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Rather, we view the difficulty of developing a coherent model
for protecting privacy interests in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as an
important cautionary tale for our effort to expand the profile of privacy
interests in property law. While privacy interests lie at the core of search and
seizure law, courts and theorists have struggled to develop a definition of
privacy expectations that can successfully anchor Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Stated otherwise, even as the Court has argued that privacy interests should
not be restricted to traditional property rights of exclusion, the Court has failed
to develop a model of protecting those interests that can stand completely
independently of traditional understandings of property.
Some have argued that ﬂaws of current Fourth Amendment law can be
found by returning privacy to its property roots.148 They argue that so long
as property rights are understood suﬃciently broadly, privacy interests can
be fully protected from intrusive searches and seizures by protecting suspects’
traditional property interests. This Article’s agenda, in many ways, is the
opposite. We do not seek to shape the law of privacy by returning it to its
property roots. Rather, we seek to return property law to its traditional
solicitousness for privacy interests. We do not claim that property concepts
can resolve all the dilemmas of privacy law. We do, however, claim that
property law is well suited to protect many privacy interests.
III. PRIVACY INTERESTS IN PROPERTY LAW
To this point, we have examined the eﬀect of privacy on property law only
peripherally. In this Part, we show that even after the emergence of privacy
law as a distinct body (or bodies) of law, privacy concerns have continued to
play a central role in several areas of property law. To be sure, the doctrines
we discuss here are not uniﬁed—mostly, they represent the ad hoc use of
privacy concerns to modify or interpret existing property law. There are,

See id.
Morgan Cloud, Property is Privacy: Locke and Brandeis in the Twenty-First Century, 55 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 37, 37-39 (2018).
147
148
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however, a few cases where privacy concerns have been referenced more
explicitly, and even viewed as an independent source of legal property rights.
We begin with instances in statutory and common law of property that have
struggled with the place of privacy in property law. We conclude this Part with
a pair of Supreme Court cases that sought to define the limits that constitutional
rights to privacy place on regulations of private residential property.
A. Property Rights, Civil Rights, and Public Accommodations
One of the most important developments in property in the last century
was the development of a body of civil rights laws. The relevant civil rights
laws curb property rightholders’ traditional rights by denying or limiting the
rightholders’ ability to exercise those traditional rights when in service of
speciﬁed kinds of invidious discrimination.
Civil rights laws for property did not come completely out of the blue.
One of the most important antecedents that ultimately contributed to the
development of modern civil rights law was the common law of public
accommodation.149 While the common law ordinarily placed few limits on the
owners’ ability to exclude others for any reason, the public accommodation
doctrine stated that common carriers and innkeepers could not deny service
arbitrarily. And they could not charge unreasonable prices for their
services.150 The early roots of the public accommodation doctrine were,
therefore, quite modest.151 But even the modest doctrine distinguished
between the private realm and open-market activity. It was only where
rightholders had voluntarily made their property the arena for extremely
public activity that their traditional exclusionary rights were curbed. While
149 See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICES
374 (3d ed. 2017) (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *164).
150 Id.
151 See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM.
L.J. 225, 256-57 (2002). In recent decades, public accommodation law has dramatically expanded, both
in case law and, more importantly, by statute. Today, the most important source of public
accommodation law is found in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits operators of
public accommodations from discriminating against customers on the basis of race, gender, religion,
national origin, familial status, and disability. Title II defines public accommodation to include (1)
“any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests”; (2) “any
restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises”; and (3) “any motion picture house, theater, concert
hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012).
In the modern era, public accommodations have frequently been understood in the broader sense of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, rather than the narrow traditional common law definition, even where
the Civil Rights Act does not formally apply. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 149, at 373-76; see
also Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform
Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1277-84 (2017); Daniel L. Schwartz, Comment, Discrimination on Campus:
A Critical Examination of Single-Sex College Social Organizations, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2117, 2124-31 (1987).
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privacy interests were never explicitly identiﬁed as the source of the
distinction between properties subject to the public accommodation and
those that were not, one can easily identify the way the doctrine oﬀered
greater protection for owners where privacy interests are likely to be greater.
Modern civil rights law is more ambitious. But we would argue that it has
followed a similar pattern of greater solicitousness to owners where privacy
interests are likely to be stronger.152
The ﬁrst federal civil rights legislation was adopted in the wake of the
Civil War, but the acts of the 1960s proved a watershed. The Civil Rights Act
of 1866 remains in force,153 but the most signiﬁcant of the civil rights acts
through the prism of property was doubtless the federal Fair Housing Act
(Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968).154 The Fair Housing Act restricts
the rights of property rightholders to withhold consent to a sale or rental,155
publish notices indicating a discriminatory preference for a sale or rental,156
and discriminate in conditions of sale or rental.157 But the Fair Housing Act
is not alone. Other federal civil rights acts also impact property rights.158
Many state and municipal civil rights acts cover similar territory.159
The stormy debate that surrounded passage of the federal Civil Rights Act of
1968 has largely receded from memory. It concerned not only issues of race, but
152 To be sure, there are other instances in which the antidiscrimination norm comes up against a
competing liberty interest. As the recent controversy about Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014), and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018),
highlighted, there may be cases when religious autonomy is thought to clash with the antidiscrimination
imperative. See, e.g., Samuel D. Brunson & David J. Herzig, A Diachronic Approach to Bob Jones: Religious
Tax Exemptions After Obergefell, 92 IND. L.J. 1175 (2017); Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State
Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631 (2016); Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve
Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929 (2015).
153 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).
154 Fair Housing Act of 1968 §§ 804–806, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606 (2012).
155 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
156 Id. § 3604(c).
157 Id. § 3604(b). Several other acts are prohibited by the Fair Housing Act. See id. § 3604.
158 E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. 1982 (2012); Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 376 (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. 12101–12213). See generally Alfred L. Brophy, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fulcrum of
Property Rights, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 75 (2014).
159 E.g., Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2007); Florida Civil Rights Act
of 1992, FLA. STAT. § 760.01 (1992); Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.010
(1966); Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363A.01 (1973); New York City Human Rights
Law, N.Y. EXEC. § 296 (McKinney 2010). For a list of state public accommodation laws and the list
of protections they aﬀord, see State Public Accommodation Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, 13TH JULY 2016 at http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/
state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/NWZ5-ECTD]; see also Joseph William
Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle in American Property Law, 1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 91, 106-07
(2011) (discussing the Married Women’s Property Acts passed by states in the late 19th century);
Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Rights and Public Accommodations: State-by-State, SOUTHEAST ADA
CENTER (2011) (describing the various state laws that complement the American Disabilities Act).
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also professed concerns for property rights.160 Although the civil rights acts
limited the traditional prerogatives of property rightholders, it is also clear that
the drafters of the various civil rights acts did not intend to sweep away concern
for property rights. The Fair Housing Act balanced prerogatives of property
owners with the interests of combating discrimination by creating exceptions to
and limitations on the broad prohibitions on discrimination. And while the word
privacy is not explicitly invoked by the Act, it is difficult to avoid the impression
that it is solicitousness for the privacy interests of property rightholders affected
by the Fair Housing Act that animates the type and nature of the Act’s exclusions.
To see this, it is important as a preliminary matter to understand the
mechanics of the Fair Housing Act. On its face, the legislation is extremely
broad. The Act works by laying out several forbidden classes of discrimination
(discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national
origin, and sometimes handicap), and by then forbidding discrimination based
on those classifications, if the discrimination takes place within a specified list
of acts (such as selling a dwelling or advertising its availability for rental).
But the Act adds a few exceptions to its coverage. The most famous of
these may be the so-called “Mrs. Murphy exemption,” which exempts from
the Act’s coverage dwellings with living quarters for four or fewer families,
so long as the owner lives in at least one of those living quarters.161 The Act
includes a similar exception for owners of certain single-family homes; unlike
the Mrs. Murphy exemption, the 296-word exception in § 3603(b)(1) lacks a
colorful nickname and is far more qualiﬁed. Nothing in these two exceptions
explicitly references privacy concerns, but their goal was to carve out a small
class of cases in which owners’ property rights would prevail over the interest
in preventing discrimination, because of the primacy of the rightholders’
privacy interests. As Senator Walter Mondale (one of the sponsors of the Fair
Housing Act) stated, the intent of the Mrs. Murphy exemption was “to

160 See Stanley P. Stocker-Edwards, Black Housing 1860–1980: The Development, Perpetuation, and
Attempts to Eradicate the Dual Housing Market in America, 5 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 50, 71 (1988) (discussing
the opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1968 by the National Association of Real Estate Boards which stated
that it would violate the rights of property owners to use their property as they pleased). See generally, Charles
M. Lamb, Congress, the Courts, and Civil Rights: the Fair Housing Act of 1968 Revisited, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1115
(1982); Jonathan Zasloff, The Secret History of The Fair Housing Act 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 247 (2016).
161 “Nothing in § 804 of this title (other than subsection (c)),” the statute states, “shall apply to
. . . rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no
more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and
occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.” 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2012). For a discussion
on the provision known as the “Mrs. Murphy exemption” or “Mrs. Murphy exception,” see generally Robert
G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair Housing Act’s Most
Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187 (2001); James D. Walsh, Note, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call
for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 605 (1999).
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exempt those who, by the direct personal nature of their activities, have a
close personal relationship with their tenants.”162
The exceptions in the Act obviously do not exhaust every potential situation in
which property rightholders might claim a privacy interest. This has led to repeated
litigation about the application of the Act (and equivalent state antidiscrimination
laws) to situations in which the complainant sought to become a roommate.
Decisions have not been uniform. Sometimes courts have stuck to the language of
the statute and held property rightholders to the duty of nondiscrimination; other
courts have upheld the primacy of the property rightholders’ privacy interest.
Compare, for instance, the 2001 decision of the District Court of
Massachusetts in Marya v. Slakey163 with the 2008 decision of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommate.com, LLC.164 Marya v. Slakey involved a complainant (Kriti Arora)
who sought to rent a room in a six-bedroom house owned by Linda Slakey.165
Slakey did not make decisions on the rentals; she rented each bedroom
separately to six tenants, but she permitted the tenants to choose replacements
as a vacancy opened up in any of the bedrooms.166 Prospective tenants were
expected to be vegetarian nonsmoking students at the University of
Massachusetts; however, prospective tenants could only be accepted with the
unanimous approval of existing tenants.167 When Arora applied for one
vacancy, she was rejected by two of the existing tenants. One (Suzanne
Castello) explained her rejection as owing to a “personality conflict,” while the
other (Paul Norris) attributed his decision to Arora’s Indian ethnicity.168
Norris stated that he did not want a third Indian roommate in addition to the
two Indians already living on the premises because he did not want “a
preponderance of one culture” in the house.169 Among Slakey’s defenses were
two that implicitly sounded in privacy interests: first, Slakey claimed that
Norris was not engaged “in the business” of renting dwelling space (meaning
he was acting in a private rather than commercial capacity), and second, Slakey
claimed she was entitled to the benefit of the Mrs. Murphy exemption.170 The
court made short work of both defenses. It observed that there was no language
in the Fair Housing Act that restricted its antidiscrimination provisions to
professional agents or landlords.171 The court also noted that Slakey did not
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

114 CONG. REC. 2495 (1968).
190 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D. Mass. 2001).
666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012).
Slakey, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 98. The opinion also spells the name as “Aurora.”
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 104.
Id.
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occupy the premises and therefore did not fall within the literal language of
the Mrs. Murphy exemption.172
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took a very diﬀerent tack in Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC.173 That case
involved a challenge to the online service Roommate.com.174 Roommate.com
is a website that matches up potential roommates with landlords and rooms.
To match them up, Roommate.com requires users to answer many questions to
establish a “profile”; among the questions are requests that users disclose sex,
family status, and sexual orientation.175 The Fair Housing Council of San
Fernando Valley sued under both the Fair Housing Act and the equivalent
California legislation.176 The Council claimed that Roommate.com was acting
as a broker and asking questions that a broker would surely be barred from
asking to steer prospective roommates in a manner that is discriminatory
under the law.177 Acknowledging that “it’s quite clear that what Roommate
does amounts to a violation” of the Fair Housing Act “[i]f the [Act] extends
to shared living situations,” the court still ruled for Roommate.com because
the Act does not apply to roommates.178 None of the privacy exceptions
within the statute directly applied to the case—not only because the
complaint covered a general practice that applied to numerous individual
homes, but also because the Fair Housing Act exceptions do not exempt
advertising and the publication of notices. The court therefore essentially
fashioned a new exception for rentals to roommates, by reinterpreting the
term “dwelling.” The court determined that in reference to “dwellings,” the
statute intended to apply only to “living unit[s] designed or intended for
occupancy by a family,” meaning that the Act applies only to “an independent
living unit . . . stop[ping] the [Act] at the front door.”179
In so ruling, the court placed great emphasis on the privacy interests of
the property rightholders. The court wrote: “Aside from immediate family or
a romantic partner, it’s hard to imagine a relationship more intimate than that
between roommates, who share living rooms, dining rooms, kitchens,
bathrooms, even bedrooms. Because of a roommate’s unfettered access to the
home, choosing a roommate implicates signiﬁcant privacy and safety
considerations.”180 “The home,” the Court noted, “is the center of our private
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

Id.
666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 1218.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1219-24.
Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1221.
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lives. . . . Holding that the [Fair Housing Act] applies inside a home or
apartment would allow the government to restrict our ability to choose
roommates compatible with our lifestyles. This would be a serious invasion
of privacy, autonomy and security.”181
As the Roommate.com ruling highlights, antidiscrimination rules for
property are sensitive to the privacy interests of property rightholders. While
courts (and legislatures) diﬀer about the precise point where privacy interests
should prevail over the societal interest in preventing discrimination, there is
little doubt that privacy interests are important enough to protect property
rightholders on at least some occasions, despite the very clear societal interest
in preventing invidious discrimination.
B. Investigative Reporting and Trespass
Privacy interests are not generally thought to be part of the law of trespass.
On paper, trespass is a strict-liability tort. According to the Restatement, any
intentional unlicensed entry onto land (in person or with an object) is a
trespass, despite whether it causes harm to the legal possessor of the land.182
Put differently, “[a]ny intentional intrusion that deprives another of
possession of land, even if only temporarily, is considered a trespass.”183
Despite the surface simplicity, there are instances where trespass cases involve
a deeper analysis of the interests. For instance, sometimes, a person enters on the
land of another with permission, but the permission was obtained by deception
or fraud. Courts have divided on the question of whether and when such
deceptions nullify the license to enter and turn the visitor into a trespasser.184
For our purposes, the most interesting of the trespass by decision cases is
Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.185 ABC reporters sought access
to an eye clinic to report on deceptive and fraudulent practices by doctors in
the clinic. To get the full information, ABC itself engaged in some deception.
A producer for the ABC program PrimeTime Live told Dr. James Desnick (the
owner of the clinic) that the program wanted to film the work of the Desnick
Eye Center and interview doctors, technicians, and patients as part of a story
on large cataract practices. The producer reassured Desnick that the segment
“would not involve ‘ambush’ interviews or ‘undercover’ surveillance, and that it

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 149, at 7.
See LL NJ, Inc. v. NBC-Subsidiary (WCAU-TV), L.P., No. 06-14312, 2008 WL 1923261, at
*16 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (“[T]here is no clear majority rule on the subject of fraud vitiating
consent to entry upon land.”).
185 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
181
182
183
184
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would be ‘fair and balanced.’”186 But the producer concealed from Desnick that
ABC also sent seven people with concealed cameras to the Desnick Eye Center
to pose as patients and surreptitiously film the clinic’s practices.187 The segment
that was ultimately aired used the film gathered by the fake patients in a
segment that ABC called an “undercover investigation” that revealed
“evidence” that Desnick performed “unnecessary cataract surgery for the
money.”188 Desnick sued on several grounds including trespass.189
Seeking to cut through the confusing case law on fraudulently obtained
licenses to enter, Judge Posner, writing for the court, stated that the different
results cannot be explained based on the nature of the fraud. Rather, he said, the
case law must be explained by the interests protected by the law. Where the
plaintiff truly sought to prevent an “invasion”—for instance, where a
“homeowner [is] victimized by the phony meter reader”—the trespass claim
should be upheld because the homeowner “does not want strangers in his house
unless they have authorized service functions.”190 By contrast, wrote Posner, here,
Desnick did not object to the presence of patients in the office: “The test patients
entered offices that were open to anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic
services and videotaped physicians engaged in professional, not personal,
communications with strangers (the testers themselves). The activities of the
offices were not disrupted . . . .”191 Posner continued, “nor was there any
‘inva[sion of] a person’s private space,’ as in our hypothetical meter-reader
case . . . . No embarrassingly intimate details of anybody’s life were publicized in
the present case. There was no eavesdropping on a private conversation . . . .”192
“Had the testers been undercover FBI agents,” noted Posner, “there would have
been no violation of the Fourth Amendment, because there would have been no
invasion of a legally protected interest in property or privacy.”193
Surprisingly, Posner did not explicitly acknowledge the relevant property
interest protected by this class of trespass cases as privacy. Instead, he
described the relevant interests as “ownership or possession of land,”194 which
is a description that could describe all trespass cases. Still, it is diﬃcult to
avoid the conclusion that Judge Posner sought to limit liability for trespass
cases premised on a fraudulently obtained license to enter only to those cases
where a privacy interest is compromised.
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

Id. at 1348.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1352.
Id.
Id. at 1352-53 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1353 (citations omitted).
Id.
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Judge Posner’s approach is not universally accepted, but it has proved
influential. Three years after Desnick, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
faced a similar set of claims against ABC and PrimeTime Live for trespass
based on deception in an investigative report. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. involved two ABC television reporters who had used fake
resumes to get employment at the supermarket Food Lion, to surreptitiously
videotape “what appeared to be unwholesome food handling practices.” 195
Citing Desnick, the court this time found for the plaintiff.196 The court
acknowledged that the reporters here, like the “test patients” in Desnick, had
gained entry by a misrepresentation that did not appear to invade any
significant protected property interest.197 Yet the court reasoned that the ABC
reporters in the Food Lion case did not simply enter the property but had
entered “nonpublic areas of the store[.]”198 According to the court, this was
more analogous to using misrepresentation to place a video camera in the
ceiling of an estranged spouse’s bedroom.199 The court therefore found the jury
finding of trespass legally justified.200 As in Desnick, the court did not explicitly
invoke “privacy” as the name of the property interest being vindicated.
To be sure, the cases of trespass based on misrepresentation are not
uniform in focusing on privacy. But there is an identiﬁable theme in some of
the case law of assessing the strength of a trespass case based on whether the
property rightholders’ privacy interests were violated.
C. Beach Access, Public Easements and Privacy Interests
Another interesting area in which the privacy interests of property
rightholders have muscled their way into the law is the ﬁeld of beach access
law. Beach-access rules are diﬃcult to summarize. The problem addressed by
beach-access law is this: often, beach areas are public, or at least open to the
public, but the best routes to the public beaches cross through private land.
In several states, courts have created doctrines for subjecting the private lands
to public easements to allow the public access to the public beaches.201
194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 518-19.
Id. at 519.
See generally 4 JAMES H. BACKMAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ¶ 34.11 (Matthew Bender
ed., 1997). In California, the judicial creation of a doctrine of public access in Gion v. City of Santa Cruz,
465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970), proved highly controversial and prompted a legislative backlash. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1009 (West 1971), enacted shortly after the Gion decision, limited the creation of implied public easements
to cases of express written offers. Still, until recently, courts resisted the legislature’s instruction to
strengthen private property rights in this context. See, e.g., Scher v. Burke, 395 P.2d 680 (Cal. 2017).
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
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The most famous of these is the judgment of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association.202 In Matthews, the
Court considered claims for access to seventy-six beachfront properties in the
coastal town of Bay Head.203 Of the seventy-six properties, six were owned
by the Bay Head Improvement Association, and most of the other seventy
were owned by Association members who had granted the Association the
right to regulate access.204 Under extant New Jersey law at the time, all
beachfront property below the mean high-tide line was owned by the state
under the “public trust doctrine,” which held that title to certain properties
were held by the state for the beneﬁt and use of the public.205 The plaintiﬀs
in Matthews claimed that because the beachfront was supposed to be available
to the public, the public was entitled to cross through private lands to gain
access to the public beaches.206 The Court agreed, arguing that public rights
to the beachfront would be “meaningless” absent the ability to access the
beach, and that the “public trust doctrine” therefore necessarily implied the
existence of a public easement over private lands to access the public beach.207
The New Jersey version of the public trust doctrine therefore subjects coastal
private lands to a public easement that allows members of the public to walk
to the beach through the private property without permission.
Yet New Jersey law has placed some limits on the judicially created public
easements. The Matthews court identified four factors to be considered
before creating and “fixing the contours” of the public easements: “[1]
[l]ocation of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore, [2] extent and
availability of publicly-owned upland sand area, [3] nature and extent of the
public demand, and [4] usage of the upland sand land by the owner.”208 Little
case law explicates the nature of the usages that warrant upholding property
rights against the potential claims of a public easement. But privacy plays a
role in the issue; the fourth factor indirectly protects the privacy interests of
beachfront property owners. Obviously, a public easement that might have
members of the public wandering past homeowners’ bedroom windows
would have a weaker claim than one that would merely have them crossing
through an empty field.
In Part IV, we will return to the issue of beach access and propose a better
and more direct way to take account of the privacy interests of homeowners
whose lots adjoin the shore.
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 364.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 365.
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D. Land Use Regulation and Private Residential Property
Another striking example of the importance of privacy interests in
property law can be seen in the regulation of land use. Several cases about the
use of land have explicitly invoked privacy interests. While some of the cases
involve privacy rights that the courts found outside the ambit of property law
(and, instead, located in speciﬁc constitutional protections for privacy),
nonetheless, it is also possible to see in the land use cases an understanding
that property rights themselves entail a privacy interest.
The question of privacy rights of residential property rightholders arose
at the national level in a pair of celebrated Supreme Court cases in the mid1970s. In 1974,209 and then again in 1977,210 the Supreme Court dealt with
constitutional challenges to local zoning ordinances that placed limitations on
the rights of property rightholders to decide who would live in their private
residences. In each case, the property rightholders challenged the ordinances
on several constitutional grounds, including a claimed infringement upon the
owners’ rights to privacy. In one case, the Supreme Court sided with the state,
and in the other case it did not. Today, the constitutional privacy doctrine for
residential property lies somewhere between the pair of rulings.
The 1974 case, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,211 involved a zoning ordinance
that permitted only one-family dwellings within the village of Belle Terre, and
defined a “family” as meaning, “[o]ne or more persons related by blood,
adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping
unit, exclusive of household servants.”212 The ordinance added that “[a]
number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a
single housekeeping unit through [sic] not related by blood, adoption, or
marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.”213 The ordinance thus forbade
unrelated roommates from living together in the village of Belle Terre, in any
number of three or more persons.214 The challengers to the village’s ordinance
were six students at S.U.N.Y. Stony Brook who were living together in a single
rented house and the owner who had rented the house to them.215 The
challengers claimed that the ordinance unconstitutionally discriminated
against unmarried persons living together and that it suffered from many other
constitutional infirmities including that “the restriction of those whom the
neighbors do not like trenches on the newcomers’ rights of privacy.”216 The
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
416 U.S. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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Court dismissed all the challenges.217 While labelling the “rights of privacy” a
fundamental constitutional right, the Court found no reason to believe that
the land use restriction affected the right in any way.218 Instead, the Court
viewed the ordinance as an example of economic and social legislation where
courts should be reluctant to second-guess legislative line-drawing.219
Three years later, the Court examined a similar ordinance but reached a
diﬀerent conclusion. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,220 the Court
considered a zoning ordinance that permitted only one family to live within
dwellings in the city.221 Here, however, the deﬁnition of family was longer
and more restrictive than Belle Terre’s. Essentially, the ordinance deﬁned
family as including only a person and his or her spouse, their unmarried
children, and their parents.222 And grandchildren and children-in-law could
be included in the family, so long as they all belonged to one, and only one,
dependent child.223 Inez Moore, who challenged the ordinance, lived together
with her son Dale Sr. and two grandchildren, but fell afoul of the law because
the two grandchildren were not oﬀspring of the same child.224 One
grandchild, Dale Jr., was the oﬀspring of Dale Sr., and therefore considered a
member of the family according to the city of East Cleveland.225 But the other
grandchild, John Jr., was a nephew of Dale Sr., and cousin of Dale Jr., and
therefore not a member of the “family” according to the law.226
This time the Court invalidated the zoning ordinance. A plurality concluded
that the ordinance “slic[ed] deeply into the family itself.”227 Stating that there is a
“private realm of family life [into] which the state cannot enter,”228 the Court’s
plurality held that while zoning ordinances could legitimately regulate the family,
“when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the
challenged regulation” and “[w]hen thus examined, this ordinance cannot
survive.”229 Acknowledging the validity of state interests in preventing
overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
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Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id. at 495-96.
Id.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 496.
Id.
Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
Id.
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financial burden on East Cleveland’s school system, the plurality nonetheless
found the ordinance to have “but a tenuous relation” to resolving such problems.230
Notably, in neither case did the Supreme Court purport to interpret the scope
of the property rights at issue. Indeed, of the five justices who voted to strike
down the offending ordinance in Moore and attributed their ruling to the
constitutional guarantee of “substantive” due process, only one—Justice Stevens
in a concurring opinion—explicitly labeled the protected interest as property. 231
Still, the importance of privacy in property and land use regulation is evident.
IV. INCORPORATING PRIVACY IN PROPERTY LAW
In this Part, we present our normative thesis. First, we show how property
doctrine should change to take greater account of privacy interests; in the
next Section, we look at how privacy concerns should change our
understanding of property theory.
A. Toward a New Understanding of Property Law
Doctrinally, we argue that property law should take account of privacy
interests and, moreover, should be tailored to respect them. As we have
shown,232 some key aspects of extant property doctrine—in particular, owners’
right to exclude—already embody privacy concerns. We propose adopting more
broadly the rule that the protection of property rights should be calibrated to
the strength of privacy expectations of the owner wherever possible. In saying
this, we do not mean to say that where privacy expectations are low or
nonexistent, property protection should disappear. Rather, we argue for
adjusting property doctrine in two ways. First, the degree of relief offered to
aggrieved property rights owners should vary with the degree of impact on
privacy. Second, in some cases, the scope of rights that attend property
ownership should vary based upon privacy expectations. We now turn to several
specific contexts in which property doctrine can be adjusted.
Our doctrinal proposals are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.
Privacy concerns can be incorporated in almost every area of property law.
1. Trespass
The law of trespass is not as clear cut as it may initially appear. Not every
unauthorized entry of another’s property is actionable. As we showed in the
previous Part, courts have sanctioned physical entry into other persons’ property
230
231
232

Id. at 500.
Id. at 513.
See supra Part III.B.
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when permission to enter was gained by fraud.233 And courts have authorized
certain unauthorized entries into others’ airspace.234 At the same time, courts
have failed to develop a coherent theory that explains when physical invasions
of another’s space are actionable and when they are not. We posit that protection
of privacy interests can serve as a unifying principle of trespass cases, and, thus,
be serviceable to courts and private actors alike. Explicit recognition of the fact
that privacy is one of the property interests protected by trespass can help clear
up many of the doctrinal difficulties of trespass.
To illustrate this, consider again the case of trespass predicated on a
theory of misrepresentation or fraudulently obtained license. As we noted,
one line of case law can be interpreted as distinguishing actionable trespass
based on privacy interests.235 Speciﬁcally, we observed that Judge Posner’s
ruling in Desnick seems implicitly to identify the privacy interest as one of
the property rights sought to be upheld by the tort of trespass, and to rule
that where someone enters property because of misrepresentation, that entry
should only be considered trespassory if the entry results in harm to the
privacy interest. We argue that Posner’s implicit argument should be made
explicit and expanded. One component of the value that landowners (and
other property rightholders with rights of possession) realize from possession
is the ability to protect their privacy. Openly recognizing this with trespass
makes it possible to identify actionable instances of the tort in several cases.
One case where the privacy interest can help has already been noted: it can
distinguish between cases where a misrepresentation nullifies a license and
turns an entry into trespass and those where the misrepresentation cannot
nullify the license. A second case where privacy interests can help involves
aerial or subterranean entry to land. While trespass nominally occurs whenever
there is purposeful unlicensed entry on to land, no matter how trivial, in
practice, many courts have refused to uphold trespass claims premised on entry
the court considered not to interfere with protected property interests. For
instance, in Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, the court denied liability for
trespass by two airline companies—United and Pacific—for repeatedly flying
airplanes over the plaintiff’s land at distances as low as 150 feet above ground.236
The court acknowledged that the traditional doctrine of cujus est solum ejus est
See supra Part III.
For instance, in Hinman v. Pacific Air Transportation, 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936), the
court explained,
233
234

It would be, and is, utterly impracticable and would lead to endless confusion, if the law
should uphold attempts of landowners to stake out, or assert claims to definite, unused
spaces in the air in order to protect some contemplated future use of it. . . . We will not
foist any such chimerical concept of property rights upon the jurisprudence of this country.
235
236

See supra Part III.B.
84 F.2d 755, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1936).
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usque ad coelum237 (generally called the ad coelum doctrine) granted owners of
land ownership not only of surface areas, but of the adjacent subterranean areas
down to the center of the earth, and of adjacent airspace extending into the
heavens.238 If interpreted literally this doctrine would have rendered all flights
over private land, before the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,239 trespass unless the
airline got licenses from each and every overflown plot of land.240 The Hinman
court—like others faced with claims of trespass by overflight—brushed aside
the trespass claim in uncompromising terms. The court ruled that the ad coelum
doctrine “is not the law, and . . . never was the law.”241 It then proceeded to
acknowledge the validity of owners’ claims to aerial rights, stating that the true
law was that “the owner of the land could use the overlying space to such an
extent as he was able, and that no one could ever interfere with that use.”242
Similarly extreme language appeared in United States v. Causby,243 where the
Supreme Court stated that the ad coelum doctrine “has no place in the modern
world,” before ruling that the owner of land owns only “the immediate reaches
of the enveloping atmosphere.”244 But the Court found a taking of property
when airplanes flew 83 feet off the ground; this distance apparently fell within
the boundaries of the “immediate reaches.”245
These cases may have important, yet unappreciated, implications now
because of the growing use of drones. The case law reveals no clear answer to
the question of when an aerial intrusion constitutes a trespass. Causby suggests
the answer is to be found in measure of distance of eighty-three feet or more
from the ground; Hinman suggests a different answer—the ownership of land
extends only to the aerial distance of the owner’s actual uses. How should
courts react when landowners raise claims of trespass by overflight of drones?
One possible answer lies in examination of the privacy interests. Rather than
237 The literal translation is “whoever owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths.”
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 149, at 10 n.*.
238 Hinman, 84 F.2d at 757.
239 Id.
240 See William F. Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, J.L. & ECON. 1, 31
(1972) (“[W]e must dismiss [trespass] as a tool incapable of inducing eﬃcient allocation of
resources.”); Colin Cahoon, Comment, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 J.
AIR L. & COM. 157, 191-92 (1990) (describing diﬀerent ways to evaluate ownership of airspace above
ﬁve hundred feet); Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 165-70 (2015)
(discussing the ad coelom doctrine in the context of United States v. Causby); see also Airplane Noise,
Property Rights, and the Constitution, supra note 26, at 1431 (“[F]or the landowner to have full
enjoyment of his property ‘he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the
enveloping atmosphere”; invasions of that airspace ‘are in the same category as invasions of the
surface.’” (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264-65 (1946))).
241 Hinman, 84 F.2d at 757.
242 Id.
243 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
244 Id. at 261, 264.
245 Id. at 266.
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focus solely on use or non-use of airspace, or an eighty-three–foot
measurement of the “immediate reaches,”246 courts can look to the nature of
the property interest threatened by the invasion. Some modern drones have
cameras and transmission capabilities, and are readily used for surveillance,
posing a significant threat to the privacy of overflown properties. A trespass
claim ought to be viable even where the owner cannot show a use of the
airspace, when the overflight threatens the privacy of the landowner.
2. Nuisance
Another legal area that stands to benefit from our call to play up the weight
given to privacy considerations is nuisance law. Nuisance is defined as
unreasonable interference with another’s use and enjoyment of her land.247
The critical determination courts ought to make in adjudicating nuisance
claims is whether the alleged interference crosses the threshold of
unreasonableness.248 Nuisance doctrine is notoriously vague. Several
reasonableness standards compete for courts’ affiliation.249 Relatedly, nuisance
doctrine is open-ended, inviting courts to consider a host of factors in deciding
nuisance disputes.250 Given the centrality of privacy to owners’ enjoyment of
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821D, 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
See Gregory C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict Liability Wrong, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 2 (2012) (“It asks
whether the defendant has wrongfully harmed the plaintiff by unreasonably interfering with her use and
enjoyment of land.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822-828 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
249 See Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1122–23 (7th Cir. 1975) (detailing
the reasonableness standard in environmental pollution cases); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk,
27 P.3d 377, 391 (Colo. 2001) (“Generally, to be unreasonable, an interference must be significant
enough that a normal person in the community would find it offensive, annoying, or inconvenient.”);
Bechhold v. Mariner Props., Inc., 576 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (“The law of private
nuisance is a law of degree; it generally turns on the factual question whether the use to which the
property is put is a reasonable use under the circumstances . . . .”). See generally Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer
and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189 (1990) (discussing the
history of the development of the reasonableness test and describing two different versions, one that
emphasized the rights of defendants and one that emphasized the rights of plaintiffs).
250 The court in Pestey v. Cushman explained,
246
247
248

[T]o recover damages in a common-law private nuisance cause of action, a plaintiﬀ
must show that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of an unreasonable
interference with the plaintiﬀ ’s use and enjoyment of his or her property. The
interference may be either intentional . . . or the result of the defendant’s negligence.
Whether the interference is unreasonable depends upon a balancing of the interests
involved under the circumstances of each individual case. In balancing the interests,
the fact ﬁnder must take into consideration all relevant factors . . . . No one factor
should dominate this balancing of interests; all relevant factors must be considered in
determining whether the interference is unreasonable.
788 A. 2d 496, 507-08 (Conn. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 27 P.3d
at 391 (“[T]he elements of a claim of nuisance are an intentional, negligent, or unreasonably
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their property, there is no reason to exclude privacy harms from the calculus.
On the contrary, courts should examine whether the alleged interference also
compromised the victim’s privacy interest, and if the answer is yes, this factor
should heavily support classifying the activity as a private nuisance.
The nature of the cause of action we have in mind is illustrated in a legal
dispute that arose between the Tate Modern gallery in London and nearby
luxury ﬂat dwellers.251 The dwellers claim that the public platform that is part
of the gallery compromises their privacy by giving visitors direct view of their
homes.252 According to the owners the “viewing platform is unreasonably
interfering with the claimants’ enjoyment of their ﬂats, so as to be a
nuisance.”253 A former dweller, Yumi Kumazawa said she supports the lawsuit
ﬁled by the current dwellers because “their privacy should be respected.”254 It
should be further added that the units facing the viewing platform have
become less marketable because of privacy concerns.255 The case constitutes a
vivid example of the possible use of nuisance law to protect privacy interests.
While ordinarily nuisance law does not deal with visual interferences,256
nothing in the doctrine prevents such suits and in appropriate cases it should
be invoked to protect property owners’ privacy.
3. Covenants and Other Servitudes
A third area where privacy concerns can be proﬁtably integrated into
property doctrine is the law of servitudes. The law of servitudes covers a
multitude of nonpossessory property interests, from promises that are
enforceable based on one’s relationship with the burdened property
dangerous activity resulting in the unreasonable and substantial interference with a plaintiﬀ ’s use
and enjoyment of her property.”). An Oregon court explained, as well,
In determining whether the composting operation constitutes a nuisance-i.e., whether it
substantially and unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of plaintiﬀs’
property—we must assess five factors: (1) the location of the claimed nuisance; (2) the
character of the neighborhood; (3) the nature of the thing complained of; (4) the frequency
of the intrusion; and (5) the effect upon the plaintiff’s enjoyment of life, health and property.
Penland v. Redwood Sanitary Sewer Serv. Dist., 965 P. 2d 433, 436 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
251 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, Tate Modern Viewing Platform Challenged by Luxury Flat Dwellers,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2017/apr/19/tate-modernviewing-platform-prompts-writ-from-luxury-ﬂat-dwellers [https://perma.cc/X62d-5C8Q].
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 See id. (noting that one resident “looked at a couple of the ﬂats on [the side facing Tate]
but decided against them, mainly for reasons of privacy”).
256 Robert D. Dodson, Rethinking Private Nuisance Law: Recognizing Aesthetic Nuisances in the
New Millennium, 10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9 (2002) (“[C]ourts have denied aesthetic nuisance actions
on the ground that visual interference does not constitute substantial interference.”).
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(covenants and equitable servitudes) to such items as rights of way.257 Real
covenants and equitable servitudes are particularly ﬂexible, and potentially
cover every kind of activity that “touches and concerns” land.258 The
chronological reach of real covenants and equitable servitudes is indeﬁnite;
theoretically, covenants could persist in perpetuity, binding successors in
interests separated by hundreds of years from the covenant’s creation.259 The
vast scope of real covenants and equitable servitudes is restrained by a host
of judicial doctrines that deny the enforceability or even terminate the
servitudes in certain circumstances. For instance, courts will refuse to enforce
servitudes that impose unreasonable restraints on alienation260 or violate
public policy,261 and they may terminate servitudes when changed
circumstances make further enforcement impracticable.262
The increased popularity of common interest communities in recent
decades263 has expanded awareness of servitudes. Common interest
communities use covenants as a governance device to ensure that all unit owners
abide by certain rules. Substantively, the covenants span a wide range of issues
from assessment and collection of fees, through maintenance of common areas,
to usage of units. Courts have generally shown a great deal of deference to
covenants, especially those recorded in a community’s declaration.264

257 Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1261, 1262 (1982) (explaining that servitudes are “private arrangements . . . used extensively to
secure a wide variety of economic, aesthetic, and personal advantages to the owners and occupiers of land”).
258 See id. at 1263-64.
259 Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions,
70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 644 (1985) (“Freedom of contract can adversely aﬀect third parties, and,
because servitudes can be diﬃcult to remove, freedom of contract may perpetuate restrictions that
have lost their usefulness even to the parties who originally imposed them.”).
260 See generally Luke Meier & Rory Ryan, Aggregate Alienability, 60 VILL. L. REV. 1013 (2015)
(noting several cases where the courts either upheld or struck down restraints on alienation).
261 See Andrew Russell, Comment, The Tenth Anniversary of the Restatement (Third) of Property,
Servitudes: A Progress Report, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 753, 761 (2011) (noting that “[u]nder section 3.1 [of The
Third Restatement], a servitude is ‘valid unless it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates public policy’”).
262 See Comment, Termination of Servitudes: Expanding the Remedies for Changed Circumstances,
31 UCLA L. REV. 226, 227 (1983) (“Under the doctrine of changed conditions, courts will not enforce
these restrictions when a change in surrounding conditions.”).
263 Statistical Information, COMMUNITY ASS’NS INST., https://www.caionline.org/PressReleases/
pages/statisticalinformation.aspx [https://perma.cc/35KM-6ZP5]; see also Paula A. Franzese,
Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest Communities and the Rise of Government for “the Nice”,
37 URB. LAW. 335, 335 (2005) (“Common interest communities, once at the fringes of mainstream
residential life, now represent the norm of housing development.”).
264 See, e.g., Andrea J. Boyack, Common Interest Community Covenants and the Freedom of Contract
Myth, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 767, 783 (2014) (noting that “provisions of the recorded declaration as of the
date of an owner’s purchase are presumptively binding unless the provisions violate public policy”).
For a passionate defense of this approach, see Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in
the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1360-64 (1982).
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Interestingly, despite the wide array of tools available to courts to terminate or
refuse to enforce covenants,265 none specifically relates to privacy. We argue that
this should change. Courts should incorporate privacy considerations in assessing
the enforceability of covenants. Just as a covenant that unreasonably restrains
alienation is set aside, so too should the courts refuse to enforce covenants that
unreasonably infringe upon the privacy interests of burdened parties.
4. Remedies
Our ﬁnal doctrinal suggestion concerns remedies for torts that sound in
breaches of property rights, such as trespass. The remedies for such breaches
are varied, and potentially drastic.266 We argue that taking explicit account of
privacy interests should help modulate the remedies. We illustrate our
suggestions for modifying remedies in three distinct contexts.
a. Encroachments
We begin by considering the legal regime pertaining to encroachments or
permanent trespass—cases in which one trespasses by building a permanent
structure on a neighbor’s lot.267 Under the common law, encroachments were
met with an injunction. The encroached upon owner was entitled to injunctive
relief even if the encroacher acted in good faith on the erroneous belief that she
was improving her own lot.268 Nowadays, most states have statutorily softened
up the common law rule by granting courts broad discretion in establishing
remedies. Courts may award damages instead of injunctive relief to good-faith
improvers, and they may even rearrange the property rights, such as by
transferring title to the trespasser.269 For instance, instead of ordering the
destruction of the encroaching structure, courts can order that it be transferred
to the plaintiff together with the land on which it was erected, and force the

265 See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
266 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
1823, 1829 (2009) (pointing out that “the law oﬀers a property owner an impressive array of powers
and remedies, all designed to help her fend oﬀ unwanted entry onto her property”).
267 See e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 40 (2d ed. 2005)
(discussing encroachments).
268 See e.g., James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for
Property and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 134 (1993) (noting that under the traditional
view of the common law, that of “the early nineteenth century . . . when an owner vindicated his
title to the land by ejecting the improver from possession, his title was held to encompass title to
the improvements”); Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 669
(2014) (“Under the conventional common law view, the mistaken improver of land was not entitled
to any compensation from the landowner for the improvement.”).
269 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 871.1–871.7 (West 2009).
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plaintiff to compensate the defendant–encroacher.270 Alternatively, courts can
leave the encroaching edifice in the hands of the possession of the defendant
together with the land underlying, but have her pay an increased compensation
amount to the plaintiff.271 The doctrines governing courts’ discretion in cases of
good-faith encroachment are notably vague. California law, for instance, directs
courts to adjust remedies for “substantial justice.”272 It would be a relatively
straightforward matter to include privacy interests among the factors to be
considered by a court in determining the remedy for encroachment. An
encroachment that exposes areas of land where plaintiffs have privacy interests
should naturally be treated more harshly than one where no such privacy
interests are implicated. For example, an encroachment that brings on to the
plaintiff’s land a window from which the trespasser can peer into the plaintiff’s
back yard should clearly be treated more seriously than an encroachment of a
stone wall on to empty land that is being held for speculative purposes.
b. Punitive Damages
Another instance in which trespass remedies could beneﬁt from explicit
consideration of privacy relates to punitive damages. As illustrated in the
celebrated case of Jacque v. Steenberg Homes,273 even minor acts of trespass can
support awards of substantial punitive damages. Jacque involved the
unlicensed transport of a mobile home across a snowy ﬁeld owned by the
Jacques. The court found no damage suﬀered by the Jacques, but it still
awarded the Jacques $100,000 in punitive damages, and the punitive damages
award was upheld on appeal. The court justiﬁed the punitive damages award
by looking at the egregiousness of the defendant’s decision to trespass.274
Punitive damages are a controversial subject largely because they are diﬃcult
to pin down. By their nature, punitive damages awards cannot be
straightforwardly calculated by standard damages formulae. In recent
decades, the Supreme Court has placed proportionality limits on punitive
damages,275 but there is, as yet, no clear judicial enunciation of the way the
270 See Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REV. 37, 42 n.28
(1985) (reporting that at least forty-two states have adopted versions of such acts).
271 See Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 796 (1998) (discussing
this possibility).
272 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 871.3(b) (West 2000).
273 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
274 Id. at 160-61, 164.
275 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989) (“[P]etitioners
and their amici would like us to craft some common-law standard of excessiveness that relies on
notions of proportionality between punitive and compensatory damages . . . . [W]e decline that
invitation.”); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 554 U.S. 471, 503 (2008) (requiring that punitive
damages bear a reasonable relationship to damages and ruling that in maritime cases a one to one
ratio is a fair upper bound); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996) (“The principle
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proportionality limits should be applied in trespass cases. The Jacque court
itself struggled to ﬁnd an adequate means for measuring the appropriate
amount of punitive damages, and the basis for determining proportionality.276
We submit that attention to the privacy interest in property can provide
an important clarifying element in determining punitive damages awards.
Speciﬁcally, how much privacy interests are compromised by a trespass, even
if not directly compensable, should play a role in the decision to award
punitive damages and the scope of such damages.
c. Heads of Damage
A ﬁnal way in which explicit attention to privacy could improve remedies
calculations is by direct inclusion of privacy as a head of damages. While
attention to privacy damage is rare, it can be found occasionally in past cases.
Consider City of Ocean City v. Maﬀucci.277 The State of New Jersey and the
Army Corps of Engineers sought beachfront property to build new sand
dunes, and they used eminent domain to seize from the Maﬀuccis and several
others an easement over a ﬁfty-by-eighty foot strip of beach in front of their
property. The court determined that the dune obstructed views and reduced
beach access, producing small but measurable market losses to the property
owners.278 Importantly, in measuring damages, the court did not suﬃce with
the value of the loss of view, reduced beach access, and the loss of use of the
ﬁfty-by-eighty foot strip. The court added an award of “loss of privacy,”
holding that it was proper to consider the reduced privacy resulting from
increased pedestrian traﬃc should be considered part of the property “taken”
by the state.279 Other partial-takings cases have likewise viewed privacy as a
portion of the property taken, and therefore viewed a loss of privacy as a
separate head of damage that deserves compensation.280
While in the context of eminent domain, courts have been most willing to
recognize loss of privacy as a separate head of damage, there is no reason to
restrict the head of damage to such cases. Trespass, nuisance, trespass to chattels,
conversion, and, indeed many actions that result in compensable damage to
that exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages has a long
pedigree.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
276 Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 164 (“We have expressly rejected the use of a ﬁxed multiplier . . . to
calculate the amount of reasonable punitive damages . . . . While a constitutional line ought not be
marked by a simple mathematical formula, the proportionate rule for punitive damages is one factor
in determining the reasonableness of the punitive damage award.”).
277 740 A.2d 630 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
278 Id. at 640.
279 Id. at 641.
280 See, e.g., Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 449 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1969); La Plata Elec. Assoc. v.
Cummins, 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986); State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Hesselden Inv. Co.,
504 P.2d 634 (N.M. 1972).
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property interests potentially involve damage to privacy interests, and all could
benefit from the recognition of privacy as a separate head of damage.
The damages are not restricted to specific types of property or assets.
Naturally, the degree of an owner’s privacy expectations varies greatly among
assets. An owner may have a strong privacy expectation at her home and a weaker
privacy expectation at work. She may have a stronger degree of privacy
expectation for her personal papers than for the newspaper she just bought.
Indeed, property rights in certain objects—for example, a pen—characteristically
cause little or no expectation of privacy, while ownership of others—say a laptop
computer—engenders privacy expectations. But this does not mean that privacy
interests are only endangered by damage to certain kinds of assets but not others.
A home is generally considered more sensitive from the viewpoint of privacy, but
the scope of the protection granted to an owner and the remedies to which she is
entitled should depend on the privacy harm resulting from the violation. For
example, a trespass on another’s property consisting of an unauthorized U-turn
near a driveway would be treated very differently from an act of trespass
involving unauthorized passing by the owner’s bedroom window, as the latter
would engender far more serious damage to privacy interests.
Likewise, consider a case in which one person breaks into another’s car and
uses it without her permission. Ordinarily one would expect conversion of a car
not to entail great damage to privacy interests. If, however, the car owner kept
private correspondence inside the car, she should be entitled to remedies that
reflect not only for the harm suffered from the seizure of the car and the
unauthorized use, but also for the damage arising from the intrusion of her privacy.
There are certain assets whose unauthorized use would invariably involve an
intrusion of the owner’s privacy expectations. This would hold true with
smartphones, tablets, and personal computers that house private information. A
person who converts another’s smartphone instantly gains access to the owner’s
private data, which in and of itself tramples the owner’s expectation of privacy.
Tailoring damage awards is therefore an eﬀective way of tailoring the law
to protect privacy interests.
V. INCORPORATING PRIVACY IN PROPERTY THEORY
In this part, we set out to place our privacy-based account within the
broader framework of property theory,281 and explain how it interfaces with

281 Notably, there is a lack of consensus among property theorists about the essential
characteristics of the ﬁeld. See Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1471, 1477 (2013) (“Property theory today is alive with debate on core questions of entitlement design:
whether property rules or liability rules should dominate, whether an exclusion- or thing-based
vision of property should trump the bundle-of-rights metaphor, [or] whether ﬁxed tenure menus
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the three property visions that presently dominate the scholarly discourse.
The ﬁrst view can be termed “exclusion centrism,” as it puts the right to
exclude at the epicenter of property law. The second view is widely known as
the progressive property movement. It conceptualizes property as a
constellation of institutions designed to bring about human ﬂourishing. The
third vision is known as the personhood theory of property.
A. Property as the Right to Exclude
The vision that puts the right to exclude at the center of the property world
can be traced back to the English jurist William Blackstone, who famously
described property law as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of
the right of any other individual in the universe.”282 The Blackstonian
conceptualization, while antiquated, continues to exert significant influence on
modern-day property theorists.283 Echoing the essence of the Blackstonian view,
Thomas Merrill famously proclaimed that “property means the right to exclude
others from valued resources, no more and no less.”284 A similar understanding
was espoused by James Penner, who wrote that the meaning of property can be
fully accounted for via the rights to exclude and use.285 Other contemporary
theorists who have taken more nuanced positions on the centrality of the right
to exclude still clearly view exclusion as an essential property incident.286
The right to exclude holds pride of place not only in the common law property
system, but also in the civil-law tradition. In their comparative study of civil and
common law property, Yun-chien Chang and Henry Smith observe that even
though the two legal systems grew out of very different traditions and use
different property concepts, “ownership under the civil law and fee simple
ownership of land in the common law system (and for the most part the respective

aid or impede eﬃciency . . . .”). Our selection of three theories as points of comparison is not
intended to suggest that other property theories are less compelling, important, or insightful.
282 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
283 Blackstone wrote more than this one sentence on property law, and some theorists have
pointed out that the sentence may not accurately capture the essence of Blackstone’s views, and that
the view that has come to be known as “Blackstonian” may not be Blackstone’s. See Carol M. Rose,
Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 602 (1998); David B. Schorr, How
Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103, 103 (2009).
284 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 2, at 754.
285 See PENNER, supra note 2, at 68 (asserting that “property rights can be fully explained using
the concepts of exclusion and use”).
286 See e.g., Balganesh, supra note 2, at 600 (emphasizing that, to be meaningful, the idea of
property “must contain, at a minimum, some element of exclusion,” but noting that the objective of
the article “is not to argue that the right to exclude is all that there is in property”).
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notions of full ownership of personal property) coincide to a remarkable extent in
their basic features: a possessory right to prevent invasions . . . .”287
Economists, too, have placed the right to exclude at the very heart of the
institution of property. For example, Harold Demsetz pointed out that a
property regime that puts resources in the hands of a single owner and grants
her expansive exclusion powers would cause a more eﬃcient utilization of
resources.288 Other economists have highlighted that the right to exclude is
the key to the successful functioning of property markets.289
Our privacy-based theory of property both endorses and rejects key parts
of the owners’ right to exclude. While privacy interests demand strong
protection for the exclusionary rights of owners, they do not demand an
absolutist view. Rather, the strength of an owner’s right to exclude must
reﬂect the strength of the privacy interest she seeks to protect. Where there
is no plausible privacy interest to protect, there is no need to dogmatically
protect the owner’s exclusion right. And where exclusion cannot protect
privacy interests (such as where a neighbor’s use interferes with privacy), the
owner’s privacy interest should not be downplayed. As we make clear
throughout the Article, the law can and should privilege the owners’ rights to
exclude over other interests when doing so is necessary to defend their private
interests. So property owners should have strong exclusion powers as to
assets, such as their homes, computers, and all tangible and nontangible
repositories of private information. Yet our account also shows that
unauthorized intrusions that do not implicate privacy violations should not
be treated like intrusions that violate privacy.
As David Dana and Nadav Shoked powerfully show in a new paper, the
right to exclude has never been absolute and in many respects the exclusion
powers of property owners are quite weak to begin with.290 Thus, while our
account diﬀers from the most absolutist version of exclusion-centrism, it ﬁts
better with extant and historic doctrine.
B. The Progressive Property Movement
Pioneered by Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, Joseph Singer, and
Laura Underkuﬄer, and joined by many other prominent scholars, the

287 Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law
Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (2012).
288 See Demsetz, supra note 29, at 356 (1967) (noting that an owner, “by virtue of his power to
exclude others,” has “incentives to utilize resources more eﬃciently”).
289 See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 48 (4th ed. 1984) (“Exchange cannot occur without property rights, and property
rights require exclusion. Given such exclusion, the market can function as an auction system.”).
290 David Dana & Nadav Shoked, Private Property’s Edges (a work in progress) (on file with authors).
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progressive property movement presents a pluralistic view of property
designed to accommodate and promote a myriad of incommensurable
values.291 While the view advanced by progressive property scholars has much
in common with the writings of the legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s, there
are important diﬀerences between the two movements. The focus of legal
realism was mainly conceptual, while the ambition of the progressive
property movement is unabashedly normative: it calls for the furtherance of
such values as civic responsibility, environmental stewardship, life, human
ﬂourishing, autonomy, freedom, and “individual and social well-being.”292
The progressive property movement puts societal interests on par with those
of property owners, asserting that the rights of property owners should bow
down to broader societal needs and wants.293 The progressive property
movement can therefore be characterized as decidedly nonindividualistic. It
approaches property owners as members of a larger group, whose rights are
not bats, but mere sticks of an imprecisely deﬁned bundle.294
At the same time, the progressive property movement joins legal realism in
dismissing the possibility or desirability of a unified and consistent view of
property. In endorsing a “pluralistic” vision of property,295 progressive property
scholars explain that property is supposed to advance a wide range of values,
ranging from “individual interests, wants, needs, desires, and preferences” to
“social interests, such as environmental stewardship, civic responsibility, and
aggregate wealth,” to general interests, such as “life and human flourishing, the
protection of physical security, the ability to acquire knowledge and make choices,
and the freedom to live one’s life on one’s own terms.”296 The movement’s
statement explicitly posits that these values are incommensurable and therefore
cannot be “analyzed through a single metric” or “[r]educe[d] . . . to one common
currency.”297 Property problems cannot, therefore, be resolved by deduction
or balancing; rather, they must be resolved by “reasoned deliberation” that
reconciles the “incommensurable” through the use of “critical judgment,
tradition, experience and discernment” that together add up to a method of
291 See Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 744 (asserting that values implicated by property
“cannot be adequately understood or analyzed through a single metric”).
292 Id. at 743.
293 See Rosser, supra note 45, at 145 (suggesting that the core ambition of the progressive
property movement is “to recognize more exceptions to the default rights of an owner to exclude,
or put diﬀerently, to expand recognition of the public’s interest in privately held property”).
294 See Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An Empirical
Assessment, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 934 (2017) (“The emergence of the progressive property
movement has resurrected the bundle of rights conception of property and has put renewed pressure
to scale back the right to exclude.”).
295 See Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 743 (“Property implicates plural and incommensurable values.”).
296 Id.
297 Id. at 744.
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“rational choice” that “include[s] non-deductive, non-algorithmic reﬂection”
as well as other undeﬁned elements.298
Given the plurality of incommensurable values endorsed by the progressive
property movement and the strong focus on human flourishing, nothing
prevents champions of this view from adding privacy as a value that ought to be
considered and respected. Indeed, few, if any, would deny that privacy is
important to human flourishing and self-actualization. Thus, we can conjecture
with high confidence that the progressive property movement would welcome
the addition of privacy as a value that should shape property institutions.
Where we part ways with progressive property scholars is in the way we
balance privacy against other societal interests. While progressive property
scholars proclaim a commitment to the principle of incommensurability, we
believe that legal reasoning should strive to resolve legal problems in a fashion
that yields predictable and uniform results. One aim in focusing on the privacy
needs property owners is to contribute to predictability and uniformity; we seek
rulings based on common and commensurable metrics. In granting strong
property protection to property owners in protection of their privacy interests,
we might therefore find ourselves outside the consensus of progressive property
scholars who might privilege other societal interests on occasion.
We are fully mindful of this incongruence between our theory and the
ideology underlying the progressive property movement. Yet we feel that the
property vision we portray throughout the Article can accommodate some of
the central themes of the progressive property movement. Concretely, our
conception is open to the possibility of expanding the access and use
privileges of the public as long as doing so does not interfere with the owners’
privacy expectations. This position, while not fully consistent with the
principles of the progressive property scholars, may mark an acceptable
compromise for adherents of the movement.
C. The Personhood Theory
The personhood theory of property was developed by Margaret Radin,299
based on Freidrich Hegel’s justification for private property.300 Importantly, Radin
did not intend the personhood theory to be a comprehensive theory of property.301
Margaret Radin notes that some objects “embody” the owner’s personality
while others do not. Objects such as a family home or a wedding band are
Id.
See Radin, supra note 3.
See HEGEL, supra note 3.
See Gregory A. Alexander, Property and Pluralism, 80 F ORDHAM L. R EV . 1017, 1017 n.1
(2011) (“[U]nlike welfarism, the personhood theory is not and does not purport to be a
comprehensive theory of property . . . .”).
298
299
300
301
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vital to a person’s identity, and so, she argues, are entitled to the highest level
of property protection.302 By contrast, she argues that fungible assets are
generally devoid of their owner’s personality.303 In some cases, Radin argues,
owners develop personal attachments to assets, but the connection should not
earn strong protection of the law as it is merely “fetishism.”304
Radin does not deny that even fungible assets can and should enjoy the
protections of property law.305 Thus, Radin does not argue that “personhood”
can completely illuminate the contours of property law. Still, Radin powerfully
argues that the degree of legal protection granted property rights should reflect
differences in personal attachment.306 Radin argues that monetary damages
should be the principal means of redress as to transgressions involving rights in
fungible and impersonal assets.307 Likewise, highly personal assets should
therefore receive stronger protection than impersonal assets; for instance,
injunctive relief should be reserved to cases involving violations of property
rights in assets infused with a high degree of the owner’s personality.
We suggest an analogous strategy for calibrating degrees of protection.
Like Radin, we do not view the value we seek to protect—privacy interests,
in our case—to be the sole value protected by property law. But like Radin,
we view the value as suﬃciently important to serve as a good guideline for
determining the amount of legal protection to oﬀer.
Obviously, the metric we use differs greatly from Radin’s—our benchmark is
expectation of privacy while hers is level of personhood. As a result, in some
instances our framework causes outcomes that are very different than Radin’s.
For example, the personhood theory is predicated on the assumption that
individuals need objects to express their inner-self, and, thus, achieve innergrowth and self-actualization.308 Publicity through interaction between the innerself and the outside world as mediated by assets, is therefore a key component of
the personhood theory. Our theory, by contrast, is rooted in concerns for privacy
and the desire to conceal information from the world. The wedding ring is a very
personal object which conveys one’s marital status to the world. Yet it is not
302 See Radin, supra note 3, at 959-60 (listing “a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a house” as
examples of objects that “are closely bound up with personhood” and then arguing that by virtue of this
fact, owners “should be accorded broad liberty with respect to control over that ‘thing’”).
303 See id. at 986-88 (suggesting two levels of property protection, one for personal objects and
one for fungible possessions).
304 Id. at 968-70.
305 See id. at 986 (recognizing that fungible assets should receive protection, albeit less than
personal items).
306 Id. (“[T]he personhood perspective generates a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.”).
307 Id. at 988.
308 Id. at 957 (“The premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper selfdevelopment—to be a person—an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment.”).
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accompanied by a high degree of privacy expectation. A bank statement, by
contrast, may be highly impersonal, yet be viewed as intensely private.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we sought to highlight the important relationship between
privacy and property and reinstate privacy as a decisive factor in determining
the appropriate scope of property protection. Once upon a time, privacy
considerations animated property law and policy. Gradually, however, that
slipped away from the attention of scholars, who, instead, have increasingly
focused their academic investigations on information privacy. As we have shown
in the Article, though, outside of the scholarly realm, in real-world practice, the
connection between privacy and property interests continues to be strong.
In addition to emphasizing the conceptual nexus between privacy and
property, we have proposed several ways property doctrine can be reshaped to
give stronger protection to privacy interests. We have contended that refocusing
property law and policy around the value of privacy will pay dividends not only
to lawmakers but also to property theorists. The privacy-centered theory of
property that we have developed in this Article has the potential to transform
longstanding debates and disagreements about the appropriate scope of property
owners’ right to exclude and right to use, as well as to their remedial options.
Before concluding, we would like to emphasize once more that we do not
argue that privacy is the sole consideration that should animate property law.
Nor do we maintain that it ought to be the most important one. As we have
strained to clarify throughout the article, our claim is more modest: that
privacy aspects should be given greater weight in property law than they
currently receive. In a society that constantly strives for more information,
one should have a sphere where one can choose to be left alone.

